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Introduction
The empirical rejection of the assumption of complete financial markets and perfect
risk-sharing (Deaton and Paxson, 1994), which came along with the availability of new
micro data sources, paved the way for a new literature pioneered by Bewley (1983),
Huggett (1993), and Aiyagari (1994). The so called “incomplete markets” literature
studies the importance of idiosyncratic risks and household heterogeneity for optimal
consumption and savings decisions and the aggregate economy. In particular, advances
in computational speed at that time allowed economist to numerically solve multi-period
optimization problems with uncertainty and heterogeneous households. The relaxing of
assumptions of perfect foresight, certainty equivalence or complete markets, which in
particular came in handy for deriving analytical solutions (Carroll, 2001) and to solve
the problem associated with aggregation (Constantinides, 1982), also shed new light on
theoretical outcomes.
In the absence of complete financial markets, households are not able to perfectly
insure against risks by trading a complete set of state-contingent claims. This gives rise
to precautionary savings, i.e. the additional assets households accumulate to self-insure
against idiosyncratic risks. While the precautionary saving motive has been recog-
nized by economists long ago (Keynes, 1936) and was first mathematically formalized
by Leland (1968), it has now become an integral part of the theory on consumption
and savings (Attanasio, 1999) and hence a central object of study in macroeconomic
research. Since savings decisions are inherently linked to income and consumption, the
precautionary savings motive has also implications for optimal consumption. It induces
a higher marginal propensity to consume out of additional income for liquidity con-
strained households, a finding that is in line with empirical evidence (Johnson et al.,
2006) and has challenged the Permanent Income Hypothesis put forward by Friedman
(1957).
The presence of liquidity constraints and the more rigorous treatment of idiosyn-
cratic risks in incomplete markets models established new channels through which the
government can enhance household insurance, and therefore introduced new motives
for government intervention. Households’ consumption and savings decisions critically
depend, first, on the nature and magnitude of risk faced by households, and second, on
the net supply of assets available for self-insurance, both of which the government can
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influence. For example, the government or central bank can increase the net supply of
government debt or central bank money, and therefore reduce the price of self-insurance.
This also implies that under incomplete markets the proposition of Ricardian equiv-
alence (Barro, 1974) fails, and hence financing decisions by fiscal authorities matter.
More directly, the government can also reduce risks households face by e.g. increasing
overall risk-sharing through the provision of social insurance mechanisms. However, as
noticed by Krueger and Perri (2011), taking market incompleteness as purely exogenous
may also overstate the role of the government.
This thesis investigates quantitatively in a model framework the distributional and
aggregate outcomes that result from the interaction of income risk, self-insurance mo-
tives and public policies. My thesis consists of three chapters and contributes to several
lines of literature. One line of literature emphasizes the importance of the government
in affecting the net supply of assets, as it improves household liquidity by providing
additional means of saving (Woodford (1990)). In a seminal work, Aiyagari and Mc-
Grattan (1998) highlight the welfare enhancing role of government debt and determine
in a steady state analysis the optimal amount of public debt by weighting the gains from
consumption smoothing against the costs from partly displaced capital under higher in-
terest rates. Chapter 1 of this thesis builds a New Keynesian business cycle model with
sticky prices, incomplete markets and liquid and illiquid assets. It contributes to this
stream of literature by showing that in times of high income uncertainty, there is a role
for central bank to intervene in asset markets. By accommodating a heightened demand
for liquidity, the central bank can stabilize output and reduce the overall welfare costs
from uncertainty shocks.
A second stream of literature has questioned the Permanent Income Hypothesis,
i.e. that only permanent and not transitory changes in income affect household con-
sumption. In a seminal paper, Heathcote (2005) investigates in an incomplete markets
setting with heterogeneous households the effect of tax cuts on aggregate consumption,
and finds that they are highly expansionary due to a reduction in distortions. How-
ever, incomplete markets contribute only little given the fact that borrowing constrained
households constitute only a small fraction of consumers with low levels of consumption.
A redistribution exercise from high-income to low-income and constrained households
via targeted transfers by Oh and Reis (2012) confirms this result. By contrast, Kaplan
and Violante (2014) demonstrate that the partial equilibrium consumption response
to fiscal stimulus payments can be large in the presence of also wealthy liquidity con-
strained households. The model framework in Chapter 2, which builds on the one
in Chapter 1, endogenously generates a large fraction of wealthy liquidity constrained
households in line with empirical evidence and thus creates a large initial consumption
response to fiscal transfers. More importantly, we also consider the financing in a gen-
eral equilibrium set up and find that a transitory increase in government debt to finance
transfers leads to a crowding in of investment, as forward-looking households want to
hold on to their improved consumption-smoothing capacity.
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Last, my thesis considers a third common channel in the literature through which
the government can affect households’ precautionary savings. İmrohoroglu et al. (1995),
Heathcote (2005) and Engen and Gruber (2001) show that the government can reduce
the risks faced by households and enhance their risk sharing through social insurance.
Revisiting the argument by Hubbard et al. (1995) that public insurance crowds out
private savings especially of the poor, I jointly model in Chapter 3 various institutions
of the social security system and quantify their importance as well as those of labor
market dynamics for euro area differences in private net wealth inequality.
CHAPTER 1 “Precautionary Savings, Illiquid Assets, and the Aggregate Conse-
quences of Shocks to Household Income Risk” is joint work with Christian Bayer,
Volker Tjaden and Ralph Lütticke and quantifies the business cycle consequences of
fluctuations in idiosyncratic income uncertainty in a New Keynesian model with sticky
prices, incomplete markets, and portfolio choice between liquid and illiquid assets. We
empirically document that households face large income uncertainty that varies sub-
stantially over the business cycle. In times of heighted income uncertainty, households
increase their demand for precautionary savings and rebalance their portfolio toward
the liquid “paper” asset, as it provides better consumption-smoothing services. This
reduces their aggregate demand for consumption goods and illiquid physical capital,
leading to considerable output losses in a demand-driven economy. It is shown that in
this environment, there is a role for the central bank, following a money supply rule, to
alleviate output losses by accommodating this higher demand for liquid assets through
the provision of central bank money. Furthermore, the welfare costs of uncertainty
shocks crucially depend on the households’ income and asset positions and whether the
central bank engages in stabilization policies or not.
CHAPTER 2 “Fiscal Stimulus Payments and Precautionary Investment” emerged
from a joint project with Christian Bayer and Ralph Lütticke and assesses, in a closely
related framework as in Chapter 2, the aggregate effects of deficit-financed govern-
ment transfers to households. These types of transfers have become an important fiscal
policy measure by the U.S. government to stimulate the economy in the last two re-
cessions. We match the distribution of consumption responses to fiscal transfers as
provided by empirical studies. We then show that this partial equilibrium consumption
response is amplified in general equilibrium, as in the presence of nominal rigidities, a
higher consumption demand is met by higher production, further boosting consump-
tion through the disposable income channel. More importantly, debt-financed transfers
increase individual liquidity and enhance market liquidity through a higher net supply
of government bonds. This leads to a crowding in private investment if the expan-
sion in government debt is transitory, as households want to hold on to their improved
consumption-smoothing capacity. This precautionary investment channel dominates
the negative wealth effect of a future increase in distortionary labor taxes, making
aggregate effects expansionary independent of the mode of financing.
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In CHAPTER 3 “Public Insurance and Wealth Inequality: A Euro Area Analysis”,
I analyze the quantitative importance of cross-country differences in labor market risks
and social security institutions for euro area differences in private net wealth inequal-
ity. I document the empirical puzzle that euro area countries with more redistributive
and generous public insurance policies, robustly show higher inequality in private net
wealth. Revisiting the argument by Hubbard et al. (1995) that public insurance crowds
out private savings especially of the poor, I construct a life-cycle model with heteroge-
neous households and incomplete markets that features exogenous labor market risks,
unemployment benefits, means-tested minimum income support and public and occu-
pational pensions. Calibrating the model to the euro area differences in the net earnings
process, unemployment dynamics and social security system, it can account for 70.1%
of the cross-country differences in the net wealth Gini coefficients for the bottom 95% of
the wealth distribution. Welfare policies contribute 57.5% to the wealth inequality dif-
ferences across the euro area, while net earnings and unemployment dynamics account
for 12.6%.
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Chapter 1
Precautionary Savings, Illiquid Assets, and
the Aggregate Consequences of Shocks to
Household Income Risk
Households face large income uncertainty that varies substantially over the
business cycle. We examine the macroeconomic consequences of these vari-
ations in a model with incomplete markets, liquid and illiquid assets, and
a nominal rigidity. Heightened uncertainty depresses aggregate demand
as households respond by hoarding liquid “paper” assets for precautionary
motives, thereby reducing both illiquid physical investment and consump-
tion demand. This translates into output losses, which a central bank can
prevent by providing liquidity. We show that the welfare consequences of
uncertainty shocks crucially depend on a household’s asset position. House-
holds with little human capital but high illiquid wealth lose the most from
an uncertainty shock and gain the most from stabilization policy.
1. Introduction
The Great Recession has brought about a reconsideration of the role of uncertainty
in business cycles. Increased uncertainty has been documented and studied in various
markets, but uncertainty with respect to household income stands out in its size and
importance. Shocks to household income are persistent and their variance changes
substantially over the business cycle. The seminal work by Storesletten et al. (2001)
estimates that during an average NBER recession, income uncertainty faced by U.S.
households, interpreted as income risk – i.e. the variance of persistent income shocks,
is more than twice as large as in expansions.
These sizable swings in household income uncertainty lead to variations in the
propensity to consume if asset markets are incomplete so that households use pre-
cautionary savings to smooth consumption. This paper quantifies the aggregate con-
sequences of this precautionary savings channel of uncertainty shocks by means of a
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. In this model, households have access
to two types of assets to smooth consumption. They can either hold liquid money or
invest in illiquid but dividend paying physical capital. This asset structure allows us
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to disentangle savings and physical investment and obtain aggregate demand fluctu-
ations.1 To obtain aggregate output effects from these fluctuations, we augment this
incomplete markets framework in the tradition of Bewley (1979) by sticky prices à la
Calvo (1983).
We model the illiquidity of physical capital by infrequent participation of households
in the capital market, such that they can trade capital only from time to time. This
can be considered as an approximation to a more complex trading friction as in Kaplan
and Violante (2014), who follow the tradition of Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956) in
modeling the portfolio choice between liquid and illiquid assets.
In this economy, when idiosyncratic income uncertainty increases, individually opti-
mal asset holdings rise and consumption demand declines. Importantly, households also
rebalance their portfolios toward the liquid asset because it provides better consump-
tion smoothing. These effects are reminiscent of the observed patterns of the share of
liquid assets in the portfolios of U.S. households during the Great Recession (see Figure
1.1). According to the 2010 Survey of Consumer Finances, the share of liquid assets in
the portfolios increased relative to 2004 across all wealth percentiles, with the strongest
relative increase for the lower middle-class. In our model, this portfolio rebalancing
towards liquid paper reinforces, through a decline in physical investment, the decline
in consumption demand caused by higher uncertainty. Consequently, aggregate de-
mand declines even more strongly than consumption and investment and consumption
co-move.
Quantitatively, we find the following: a two standard deviation increase in household
income uncertainty decreases aggregate activity by roughly 0.5% on impact and 0.4%
over the first year under the assumption of a monetary policy that follows a constant
nominal money growth rule (Friedman’s “k% rule”). This is about half the effect size
that Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2015) report for a fiscal policy uncertainty at the zero
lower bound. Imposing a Taylor-type rule for monetary policy as estimated in Chowd-
hury and Schabert (2008), we still find a 0.3% decrease in output upon the uncertainty
shock. This is more than twice as large as the effect of fiscal policy uncertainty in
“normal” non zero-lower-bound times reported in Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2015).
Importantly, in all cases the economy recovers only sluggishly over a five-year horizon
in our model.
Since the relative price of capital falls but the value of money increases upon an
uncertainty shock, such a shock has not only aggregate but also rich distributional
consequences. Our welfare calculations imply that households rich in physical or hu-
man capital lose the most, because factor returns fall in times of high uncertainty. In
contrast, welfare losses decline in money holdings as their value appreciates. To under-
stand the welfare consequences of systematic policy responses to uncertainty shocks,
we compare a regime where monetary policy follows Friedman’s k%-rule to one where
monetary policy provides additional money to stabilize inflation. Since an uncertainty
shock effectively works like a demand shock in our model, monetary policy is able to
reduce the negative effects on output and alleviate welfare consequences. On aver-
1In a standard Aiyagari (1994) economy, where all savings are in physical capital, an increase in
savings does not lead to a fall in total demand (investment plus consumption) because savings increase
investments one-for-one.
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Figure 1.1: Portfolio share of liquid assets by percentiles of wealth, 2010 vs. 2004
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Notes: Portfolio share: Net liquid assets/Net total assets. Net liquid assets:
cash, money market, checking, savings and call accounts, as well as government
bonds and T-Bills net of credit card debt. Cash holdings are estimated by
making use of the Survey of Consumer Payment Choice for 2008, as in Kaplan
and Violante (2014). Households with negative net liquid or net illiquid wealth,
as well as the top 5% by net worth, are excluded from the sample. The bar
chart displays the average change in each wealth decile, and the dotted line an
Epanechnikov Kernel-weighted local linear smoother with bandwidth 0.15.
age, households would be willing to forgo 0.41% of their consumption over the first 20
quarters to eliminate the uncertainty shock, but this number is reduced to 0.25% with
stabilization. In the latter regime, households rich in human capital pay the cost of
the stabilization policy, because they save (partly in money) and thereby finance the
monetary expansion. Moreover, without stabilization, these households profit from low
prices of the illiquid asset in which they accumulate their long-term savings.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 starts off with a review
of the related literature. Section 4 develops our model, and Section 4 discusses the
solution method. Section 5 introduces our estimation strategy for the income process
and explains the calibration of the model. Section 6 presents the numerical results.
Section 7 concludes. An Appendix follows that provides details on the properties of
the value and policy functions, the numerics, the estimation of the uncertainty process
from income data, and further robustness checks.
2. Related Literature
Our paper contributes to the recent literature that explores empirically and theoretically
the aggregate effects of time-varying uncertainty. The seminal paper by Bloom (2009)
discusses the effects of time-varying (idiosyncratic) productivity uncertainty on firms’
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factor demand, exploring the idea and effects of time-varying real option values of
investment. This paper has triggered a stream of research that explores under which
conditions such variations have aggregate effects.2
A more recent branch of this literature investigates the aggregate impact of uncer-
tainty shocks beyond their transmission through investment and has also broadened the
sources of uncertainty studied. The first papers in this vein highlight non-linearities
in the New Keynesian model, in particular the role of precautionary price setting.3
Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2015), for example, look at a medium-scale DSGE model à
la Smets and Wouters (2007). They find that at the zero lower bound output drops by
more than 1% after a two standard deviation shock to the volatility of taxes if a coun-
tervailing fiscal policy response is ruled out. Off the ZLB the drop reduces to 0.1%.4
In a similar framework, Basu and Bundick (2012) highlight the labor market response
to uncertainty about aggregate TFP and time preferences. They argue that, if uncer-
tainty increases, the representative household will want to save more and consume less.
Then, with King et al. (1988) preferences, the representative household will also supply
more labor, which in a New Keynesian model depresses output through a “paradox of
toil.” When labor supply increases, wages and hence marginal costs for firms fall. This
increases markups when prices are sticky, which finally depresses demand for consump-
tion and investment, and a recession follows. Overall, they find similar aggregate effects
as Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2015), in particular at the zero-lower bound.
While our paper also focuses on precautionary savings, it differs substantially in
the transmission channel. We are agnostic about the importance of the “paradox of
toil,” because it crucially relies on a wealth effect in labor supply. We therefore assume
Greenwood et al. (1988) preferences to eliminate any direct impact of uncertainty on
labor supply to isolate the demand channel of precautionary savings instead.5 Moreover,
since we focus on idiosyncratic income uncertainty, we can identify the uncertainty
process outside the model from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
This focus on idiosyncratic uncertainty and the response of precautionary savings
links our paper to Ravn and Sterk (2013) and Den Haan et al. (2014). Both high-
light the importance of idiosyncratic unemployment risk. In their setups, households
face unemployment risk in an incomplete markets model with labor market search and
nominal frictions. Both papers differ in their asset market setup and the shocks con-
sidered. Ravn and Sterk (2013) look at a setup with government bonds as a means of
savings. They then study a joint shock to job separations and the share of long-term
2To name a few: Arellano et al. (2012), Bachmann and Bayer (2013), Christiano et al. (2010), Chugh
(2012), Gilchrist et al. (2014), Narita (2011), Panousi and Papanikolaou (2012), Schaal (2012), and
Vavra (2014) have studied the business cycle implications of a time-varying dispersion of firm-specific
variables, often interpreted as and used to calibrate shocks to firm risk, propagated through various
frictions: wait-and-see effects from capital adjustment frictions, financial frictions, search frictions in
the labor market, nominal rigidities, and agency problems.
3With sticky prices, firms will target a higher markup the more uncertain future demand is.
4Born and Pfeifer (2014) report an output drop of 0.025% for a similar model and a similar policy
risk shock under a slightly different calibration. Regarding TFP risk they hardly find any aggregate
effect.
5Similarly, in a search model, higher uncertainty about match quality might translate into longer
search and more endogenous separation. Thus it is not clear a priori whether labor supply would
increase or decrease on impact.
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unemployed. This increases income risk and hence depresses aggregate demand because
of higher precautionary savings. They find that such first moment shocks to the labor
market can be significantly propagated and amplified through this mechanism.
Den Haan et al. (2014) consider a model with money and equity instead, where
equity is not physical capital as in our model, but is equated with vacancy-ownership.
In addition, they assume wage rigidity. As in our model, poorer households, in their
model the unemployed, are the marginal holders of money, the low-return asset, as they
effectively discount the future more. When unemployment goes up, demand for money
increases. This in turn leads to deflation, pushing up real wages because nominal wages
are assumed to be sticky. This has a second-round effect on money demand. Because the
labor intensity of production cannot be adjusted, higher real wages depress the equity
yield on existing and newly formed vacancies, which then induces portfolio adjustments
by households towards money amplifying the deflations and the related output drop.
Our transmission mechanism shares to some extent this feature, but additionally
highlights the importance of liquidity. Households increase their precautionary savings
in conjunction with a portfolio adjustment toward the liquid asset, because its services
in consumption smoothing become more valuable to households. We find that the
liquidity effect is more important than the relative return effect in our model where the
labor intensity of production can be adjusted.
Finally, our work relates to Gornemann et al. (2012). We discuss the distributional
consequences of uncertainty shocks and of systematic monetary policy response. We find
that both differently affect households that differ in their portfolios due to differential
asset price movements. This portfolio composition aspect is new in comparison to
Gornemann et al., because we introduce decisions regarding nominal versus real asset
holdings to the household’s problem.
3. Model
We model an economy inhabited by two types of agents: (worker-)households and en-
trepreneurs. Households supply capital and labor and are subject to idiosyncratic shocks
to their labor productivity. These shocks are persistent and have a time-varying vari-
ance. Households self-insure in a liquid nominal asset (money) and a less liquid physical
asset (capital). Liquidity of money is understood in the spirit of Kaplan and Violante’s
(2014) model of wealthy hand-to-mouth consumers, where households hold capital, but
trading capital is subject to a friction. We model this trading friction as limited partic-
ipation in the asset market. Every period, a fraction of households is randomly selected
to trade physical capital. All other households may only adjust their money holdings.6
While money is subject to an inflation tax and pays no dividend, capital can be rented
out to the intermediate-good-producing sector on a perfectly competitive rental market.
This sector combines labor and capital services into intermediate goods and sells them
to the entrepreneurs.
6We choose to exclude trading as a choice, and hence we use a simplified framework relative to
Kaplan and Violante (2014) for numerical tractability. Random participation keeps the households’
value function concave, thus making first-order conditions sufficient, and therefore allows us to use a
variant of the endogenous grid method as an algorithm for our numerical calculations. See Appendix
A for details.
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Entrepreneurs capture all pure rents in the economy. For simplicity, we assume that
entrepreneurs are risk neutral. They obtain rents from adjusting the aggregate capital
stock due to convex capital adjustment costs and, more importantly, from differentiating
the intermediate good. Facing monopolistic competition, they set prices above marginal
costs for these differentiated goods. Price setting, however, is subject to a pricing
friction à la Calvo (1983) so that entrepreneurs may only adjust their prices with some
positive probability each period. The differentiated goods are finally bundled again to
the composite final good used for consumption and investment.
The model is closed by a monetary authority that provides money in positive net
supply and adjusts money growth according to the prescriptions of a Taylor type rule,
which reacts to inflation deviations from target. All seigniorage is wasted.
3.1 Households
There is a continuum of ex-ante identical households of measure one indexed by i.
Households are infinitely lived, have time-separable preferences with time-discount fac-
tor β, and derive felicity from consumption cit and leisure. They obtain income from
supplying labor and from renting out capital. A household’s labor income wthitnit is
composed of the wage rate, wt, hours worked, nit, and idiosyncratic labor productivity,
hit, which evolves according to the following AR(1)-process:
log hit = ρh log hit−1 + it, it ∼ N (0, σht) . (1.1)
Households have Greenwood-Hercowitz-Huffman (GHH) preferences and maximize the
discounted sum of felicity:
V = E0 max{cit,nit}
∞∑
t=0
βtu (cit − hitG(nit)) . (1.2)
The felicity function takes constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) form with risk aver-
sion ξ:
u(xit) =
1
1− ξ x
1−ξ
it , ξ > 0,
where xit = cit − hitG(nit) is household i’s composite demand for the bundled physical
consumption good cit and leisure. The former is obtained from bundling varieties j of
differentiated consumption goods according to a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator:
cit =
(∫
c
η−1
η
ijt dj
) η
η−1
.
Each of these differentiated goods is offered at price pjt so that the demand for each of
the varieties is given by
cijt =
(
pjt
Pt
)−η
cit,
where Pt =
(∫
p1−ηjt dj
) 1
1−η is the average price level.
The disutility of work, hitG(nit), determines a household’s labor supply given the
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aggregate wage rate through the first-order condition:
hitG
′(nit) = wthit. (1.3)
We weight the disutility of work by hit to eliminate any Hartman-Abel effects of un-
certainty on labor supply. Under the above assumption, a household’s labor decision
does not respond to idiosyncratic productivity hit, but only to the aggregate wage wt.
Thus we can drop the household-specific index i, and set nit = Nt. Scaling the disutilty
of working by hit effectively sets the micro elasticity of labor supply to zero. There-
fore, it simplifies the calibration as we can calibrate the model to the income risk that
households face without the need to back out the actual productivity shocks. What is
more, without this assumption, higher realized uncertainty leads to higher productivity
inequality and hence increases aggregate labor supply.7
We assume a constant Frisch elasticity of aggregate labor supply with γ being the
inverse elasticity:
G(Nt) =
1
1 + γN
1+γ
t , γ > 0,
and use this to simplify the expression for the composite consumption good xit. Exploit-
ing the first-order condition on labor supply, the disutility of working can be expressed
in terms of the wage rate:
hitG(Nt) = hit
N1+γt
1 + γ =
hitG
′(Nt)Nt
1 + γ =
wthitNt
1 + γ .
In this way the demand for xit can be rewritten as:
xit = cit − hitG(Nt) = cit − wthitNt1 + γ .
Total labor input supplied is given by:
N˜t = Nt
∫
hitdi.
Following the literature on idiosyncratic income risk, we assume that asset markets
are incomplete. Households can only trade in nominal money, m˜it, that does not bear
any interest and in capital, kit, to smooth their consumption. Holdings of both assets
have to be non-negative. Moreover, trading capital is subject to a friction.
This trading friction allows only a randomly selected fraction of households, ν, to
participate in the asset market for capital every period. Only these households can
freely rebalance their portfolios. All other households obtain dividends, but may only
adjust their money holdings. For those households participating in the capital market,
7Without this assumption, nit increases in hit, and hence the aggregate effective labor supply,∫
hitnitdi, increases when the dispersion of hit increases. While it would not change the household’s
problem in its asset choices and the choice of xit, it would complicate aggregation.
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the budget constraint reads:
cit +mit+1 + qtkit+1 =
mit
pit
+ (qt + rt)kit + wthitNt, mit+1, kit+1 ≥ 0,
where mit is real money holdings, kit is capital holdings, qt is the price of capital, rt is
the rental rate or “dividend,” and pit = PtPt−1 is the inflation rate. We denote real money
holdings of household i at the end of period t by mit+1 := m˜it+1Pt .
Substituting the expression cit = xit + wthitNt1+γ for consumption, we obtain:
xit +mit+1 + qtkit+1 =
mit
pit
+ (qt + rt)kit +
γ
1 + γwthitNt, mit+1, kit+1 ≥ 0. (1.4)
For those households that cannot trade in the market for capital the budget constraint
simplifies to:
xit +mit+1 =
mit
pit
+ rtkit +
γ
1 + γwthitNt, mit ≥ 0. (1.5)
Note that we assume that depreciation of capital is replaced through maintenance such
that the dividend, rt, is the net return on capital.
Since a household’s saving decision will be some non-linear function of that house-
hold’s wealth and productivity, the price level, Pt, and accordingly aggregate real money,
Mt+1 = M˜t+1Pt , will be functions of the joint distribution Θt of (mt, kt, ht). This makes Θt
a state variable of the household’s planning problem. This distribution evolves as a re-
sult of the economy’s reaction to shocks to uncertainty that we model as time variations
in the variance of idiosyncratic income shocks, σ2ht. This variance follows a stochastic
volatility process, which allows us to separate shocks to the variance from shocks to the
level of household income.
σ2ht = σ¯2 exp(st), st = ρsst−1 + εt, εt ∼ N
(
− σ2s2(1−ρ2s) , σs
)
, (1.6)
where σ¯2 is the steady state labor risk that households face, and s shifts this risk.
Shocks εt to income risk are the only aggregate shocks in our model.
With this setup, the dynamic planning problem of a household is then characterized
by two Bellman equations: Va in the case where the household can adjust its capital
holdings and Vn otherwise:
Va(m, k, h; Θ, s) =maxk′,m′au[x(m,m
′
a, k, k
′, h)]
+ β [νEV a(m′a, k′, h′,Θ′, s′) + (1− ν)EV n(m′a, k′, h′,Θ′, s′)] ,
Vn(m, k, h; Θ, s) =maxm′nu[x(m,m
′
n, k, h)]
+ β [νEV a(m′n, k, h′,Θ′, s′) + (1− ν)EV n(m′n, k, h′,Θ′, s′)] . (1.7)
In line with this notation, we define the optimal consumption policies for the ad-
justment and non-adjustment cases as x∗a and x∗n, the money holding policies as m∗a
and m∗n, and the capital investment policy as k∗. Details on the properties of the value
functions (smooth and concave) and policy functions (differentiable and increasing in
total resources), the first-order conditions, and the algorithm we employ to calculate
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the policy functions can be found in Appendix A.
3.2 Intermediate Goods Producers
Intermediate goods are produced with a constant returns to scale production function:
Yt = N˜αt K
(1−α)
t .
LetMCt be the relative price at which the intermediate good is sold to entrepreneurs.
The intermediate-good producer maximizes profits,
MCtYt = MCtN˜αt K
(1−α)
t − wtN˜t − (rt + δ)Kt,
but it operates in perfectly competitive markets, such that the real wage and the user
costs of capital are given by the marginal products of labor and capital:
wt = αMCt
(
Kt/N˜t
)1−α
, (1.8)
rt + δ = (1− α)MCt
(
N˜t/Kt
)α
. (1.9)
3.3 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs differentiate the intermediate good and set prices. They are risk neutral
and have the same discount factor as households. We assume that only the central
bank can issue money so that entrepreneurs participate in neither the money nor the
capital market. This assumption gives us tractability in the sense that it separates the
entrepreneurs’ price setting problem from the households’ saving problem. It enables
us to determine the price setting of entrepreneurs without having to take into account
households’ intertemporal decision making. Under these assumptions, the consumption
of entrepreneur j equals her current profits, Πjt. By setting the prices of final goods,
entrepreneurs maximize expected discounted future profits:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtΠjt. (1.10)
Entrepreneurs buy the intermediate good at a price equalling the nominal marginal
costs, MCtPt, where MCt is the real marginal costs at which the intermediate good
is traded due to perfect competition, and then differentiate them without the need
of additional input factors. The goods that entrepreneurs produce come in varieties
uniformly distributed on the unit interval and each indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. Entrepreneurs
are monopolistic competitors, and hence charge a markup over their marginal costs.
They are, however, subject to a Calvo (1983) price setting friction, and can only update
their prices with probability θ. They maximize the expected value of future discounted
profits by setting today’s price, pjt, taking into account the price setting friction:
max
{pjt}
∞∑
s=0
(θβ)sEΠjt,t+s =
∞∑
s=0
(θβ)sEYjt,t+s(pjt −MCt+sPt+s) (1.11)
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s.t. : Yjt,t+s =
(
pjt
Pt+s
)−η
Yt+s,
where Πjt,t+s is the profits and Yjt,t+s is the production level in t+ s of a firm j that set
prices in t.
We obtain the following first-order condition with respect to pjt:
∞∑
s=0
(θβ)sEYjt,t+s
 p
∗
jt
Pt−1
− η
η − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
µ
MCt+s
Pt+s
Pt−1
 = 0, (1.12)
where µ is the static optimal markup.
Recall that entrepreneurs are risk neutral and that they do not interact with house-
holds in any intertemporal trades. Moreover, aggregate shocks to the economy are small
and homoscedastic, since the only aggregate shock we consider is the shock to the vari-
ance of housdehold income shocks. Therefore, we can solve the entrepreneurs’ planning
problem locally by log-linearizing around the zero inflation steady state, without having
to know the solution of the households’ problem. This yields, after some tedious algebra
(see, e.g., Galí, 2008), the New Keynesian Phillips curve:
log pit = βEt(log pit+1) + κ(logMCt + µ), (1.13)
where
κ = (1− θ)(1− βθ)
θ
.
We assume that besides differentiating goods and obtaining a rent from the markup
they charge, entrepreneurs also obtain and consume rents from adjusting the aggregate
capital stock. Since the dividend yield is below their time-preference rate, in equilib-
rium entrepreneurs never hold capital. The cost of adjusting the stock of capital is
φ
2
(
∆Kt+1
Kt
)2
Kt + ∆Kt+1. Hence, entrepreneurs will adjust the stock of capital until the
following first-order condition holds:8
qt = 1 + φ
∆Kt+1
Kt
. (1.14)
8Note that we assume capital adjustment costs only on new capital (or on the active destruction of
old capital) but not on the replacement of depreciation. Depreciated capital is assumed to be replaced
at the cost of one-to-one in consumption goods, and replacement is forced before the capital stock
is adjusted at a cost. This differential treatment of depreciation and net investment simplifies the
equilibrium conditions substantially, because the user cost of capital and hence the dividend paid to
households do not depend on the next period’s stock of capital, and the decisions of non-adjusters are
not influenced by the price of capital qt. Quantitatively, the fluctuations in dividends that maintenance
at price qt would bring about are negligible. Upon a 2 standard deviation shock to uncertainty, qt falls
to 0.96 – hence reducing depreciation cost by 4 basis points quarterly under the alternative specification
where maintenance comes at cost qt.
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3.4 Goods, Money, Capital, and Labor Market Clearing
The labor market clears at the competitive wage given in (1.8); so does the market for
capital services if (1.9) holds. We assume that the money supply is given by a monetary
policy rule that adjusts the growth rate of money in order to stabilize inflation:
Mt+1
Mt
= (θ1/pit)1+θ2
(
Mt
Mt−1
)θ3
(1.15)
Here Mt+1 is the real balances at the end of period t (with the timing aligned to our
notation for the households’ budget constraint). The coefficient θ1 ≥ 1 determines
steady-state inflation, and θ2 ≥ 0 the extent to which the central bank attempts to
stabilize inflation around its steady-state value: the larger θ2 the stronger is the reaction
of the central bank to deviations from the inflation target. When θ2 → ∞ inflation is
perfectly stabilized at its steady-state value. θ3 ≥ 0 captures persistence in money
growth. We assume that the central bank wastes any seigniorage buying final goods
and choose the above functional form for its simplicity.9
The money market clears whenever the following equation holds:
(θ1/pit)1+θ2
(
Mt
Mt−1
)θ3
Mt =
∫
[νm∗a(m, k, h; qt, pit) + (1− ν)m∗n(m, k, h; qt, pit)]
Θt(m, k, h)dmdkdh, (1.16)
with the end-of-period real money holdings of the preceding period given by
Mt :=
∫
mΘt(m, k, h)dmdkdh.
Last, the market for capital has to clear:
qt = 1 + φ
Kt+1 −Kt
Kt
= 1 + νφK
∗
t+1 −Kt
Kt
, (1.17)
K∗t+1 :=
∫
k∗(m, k, h; qt, pit)Θt(m, k, h)dmdkdh,
Kt+1 = Kt + ν(K∗t+1 −Kt),
where the first equation stems from competition in the production of capital goods, the
second equation defines the aggregate supply of funds from households trading capital,
and the third equation defines the law of motion of aggregate capital. The goods market
9For the baseline calibration this is an innocuous assumption. With constant nominal money
growth, the changes in seigniorage are negligible in absolute terms. Steady-state seigniorage is .64%
of annual output, since money growth is 2% and the money-to-output ratio is 32%. When inflation
drops, say, from 2% to 0, the real value of seigniorage increases, but only from .64% to .66% of output.
As θ2 →∞, seigniorage occasionally turns slightly negative. It is numerically very expensive to put a
constraint on Mt, and hence we abstain from doing so to keep the dynamic problem tractable. This
unboundedness of seigniorage only affects the effectiveness of the stabilization policy. The central bank
can commit to decrease seigniorage more in the future without the requirement of (weakly) positive
seigniorage. One possible assumption to rationalize this is to assume that seigniorage is not wasted on
government consumption but is used to store goods in an inefficient way.
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then clears due to Walras’ law, whenever both money and capital markets clear.
3.5 Recursive Equilibrium
A recursive equilibrium in our model is a set of policy functions {x∗a, x∗n,m∗a,m∗n, k∗},
value functions {Va, Vn}, pricing functions {r, w, pi, q}, aggregate capital and labor sup-
ply functions {N,K}, distributions Θt over individual asset holdings and productivity,
and a perceived law of motion Γ, such that
1. Given {Va, Vn}, Γ, prices, and distributions, the policy functions {x∗a, x∗n,m∗a,m∗n, k∗}
solve the households’ planning problem, and given the policy functions, prices and
distributions, the value functions {Va, Vn} are a solution to the Bellman equations
(1.7).
2. The labor, the final-goods, the money, the capital, and the intermediate-good
markets clear, i.e., (1.8), (1.13), (1.16), and (1.17) hold.
3. The actual law of motion and the perceived law of motion Γ coincide, i.e., Θ′ =
Γ(Θ, s′).
4. Numerical Implementation
The dynamic program (1.7) and hence the recursive equilibrium is not computable,
because it involves the infinite dimensional object Θt.
4.1 Krusell-Smith Equilibrium
To turn this problem into a computable one, we assume that households predict future
prices only on the basis of a restricted set of moments, as in Krusell and Smith (1997,
1998a). Specifically, we make the assumption that households condition their expecta-
tions only on last period’s aggregate real money holdings, Mt, last period’s aggregate
real money growth, ∆(logMt), the aggregate stock of capital, Kt, and the uncertainty
state, st. The reasoning behind this choice goes as follows: (1.16) determines inflation,
which in turn depends on the beginning of period money stock and last period’s money
growth. Once inflation is fixed, the Phillips curve (1.13) determines markups and hence
wages and dividends. These will pin down asset prices by making the marginal investor
indifferent between money and physical capital. If asset-demand functions, m∗a,n and
k∗, are sufficiently close to linear in human capital, h, and in non-human wealth, m, k,
at the mass of Θt, we can expect approximate aggregation to hold. For our exercise,
the four aggregate states – st, Mt, ∆(logMt), and Kt – are sufficient to describe the
evolution of the aggregate economy.10
While the law of motion for st is pinned down by (1.6), households use the following
log-linear forecasting rules for current inflation and the price of capital, where the
10Without persistence in money growth, Equation (1.16) does not depend on ∆(logMt) anymore
making it a redundant state. In this case, we set β4pi,q = 0.
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coefficients depend on the uncertainty state:
log pit = β1pi(st) + β2pi(st) logMt + β3pi(st) logKt + β4pi(st)∆(logMt), (1.18)
log qt = β1q (st) + β2q (st) logMt + β3q (st) logKt + β4q (st)∆(logMt). (1.19)
The law of motion for real money holdings, Mt, then follows from the monetary policy
rule and is given by:
logMt+1 = logMt + (1 + θ2)(log θ1 − log pit) + θ3∆(logMt).
The law of motion for Kt results from (1.17).
Fluctuations in q and pi happen for two reasons: As uncertainty goes up, the self-
insurance service that households receive from the illiquid capital good decreases. In
addition, the rental rate of capital falls as firms’ markups increase. When making their
investment decisions, households need to predict the next period’s capital price q′ to
determine the expected return on their investment. Since all other prices are known
functions of the markup, only pi′ and q′ need to be predicted.
Technically, finding the equilibrium is similar to Krusell and Smith (1997), as we
need to find market clearing prices within each period. Concretely, this means the
posited rules, (1.18) and (1.19), are used to solve for households’ policy functions.
Having solved for the policy functions conditional on the forecasting rules, we then
simulate n independent sequences of economies for t = 1, . . . , T periods, keeping track
of the actual distribution Θt. In each simulation the sequence of distributions starts
from the stationary distribution implied by our model without aggregate risk. We then
calculate in each period t the optimal policies for market clearing inflation rates and
capital prices assuming that households resort to the policy functions derived under rule
(1.18) and (1.19) from period t + 1 onward. Having determined the market clearing
prices, we obtain the next period’s distribution Θt+1. In doing so, we obtain n sequences
of equilibria. The first 250 observations of each simulation are discarded to minimize
the impact of the initial distribution. We next re-estimate the parameters of (1.18)
and (1.19) from the simulated data and update the parameters accordingly. By using
n = 20 and T = 750, it is possible to make use of parallel computing resources and
obtain 10.000 equilibrium observations. Subsequently, we recalculate policy functions
and iterate until convergence in the forecasting rules.
The posited rules (1.18) and (1.19) approximate the aggregate behavior of the econ-
omy fairly well. The minimal within sample R2 is above 99%. Also the out-of-sample
performance (see Den Haan, 2010)) of the forecasting rules is good. See Appendix D.
4.2 Solving the Household Planning Problem
In solving for the households’ policy functions we apply an endogenous gridpoint method
as originally developed in Carroll (2006) and extended by Hintermaier and Koeniger
(2010), iterating over the first-order conditions. We approximate the idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity process by a discrete Markov chain with 17 states and time-varying transition
probabilities, using the method proposed by Tauchen (1986). The stochastic volatility
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process is approximated in the same vein using 7 states.11 Details on the algorithm can
be found in Appendix A.4.
5. Calibration
We calibrate the model to the U.S. economy. The behavior of the model in steady
state without fluctuations in uncertainty does not correspond to the time-averages of
the simulated variables in the model with uncertainty shocks. Hence we cannot use the
steady state to calibrate the model, but instead iterate over the full model to match
the calibration targets.12 The aggregate data used for calibration spans 1980 to 2012.
One period in the model refers to a quarter of a year. The choice of parameters as
summarized in Tables 1 and 2 is explained next. We present the parameters as if they
were individually changed in order to match a specific data moment, but all calibrated
parameters are determined jointly of course.
5.1 Income Process
We estimate the income process and hence uncertainty faced by households from in-
come data in the Cross-National Equivalent File (CNEF) of the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID), excluding the low-income sample. We construct household income
as pre-tax labor income plus private and public transfers minus all taxes, and control
for observable household characteristics in a first stage regression. We use the residual
income to estimate the parameters governing the idiosyncratic income process ρs, ρh, σ¯,
and σs.
In a first stage regression for log-income, we control nonparametrically for the ef-
fects of age, household size, and educational attainment and parametrically with up to
squared-order terms in age for the age-education interaction. We then generate vari-
ances and first and second order auto-covariances of residual income by age groups for
the years 1970-2009. Based on these age-year variances and covariances, the param-
eters of interests are estimated by generalized method of moments (GMM). We find
that the implied quarterly autocorrelation of the persistent component of income, ρh,
is 0.976 and the average standard deviation of quarterly persistent income shocks is
σ¯ = 0.078. The implied quarterly persistence of income risk, ρs, is 0.903 and thus in
line with business cycle frequencies. The annual coefficient of variation for income risk,
σs
σ¯
, is 0.62, which is consistent with the estimates in Storesletten et al. (2004).13 Table
1.1 summarizes the parameter estimates, where the values are adapted to the quarterly
frequency of our model. Details on data selection and the estimation procedure can be
found in Appendix B.
11We solve the household policies for 30 points on the grid for money and 50 points on the grid for
capital using equi-distant grids on log scale plus outliers. For aggregate money and capital holdings we
use a relatively coarse grid of 3 points each. We experimented with changing the number of gridpoints
without a noticeable impact on results. See Appendix D.
12As this is very expensive computational-wise, we match the target-ratios within +/- 1%.
13Storesletten et al. estimate the variance of persistent shocks to annual income to be 126% higher
in times of below average GDP growth than in times of above average GDP growth. This implies that
the unconditional annual coefficient of variation of s is roughly 0.5.
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Table 1.1: Estimated parameters of the income process
Parameter Value Description
ρh 0.976 Persistence of income
σ¯ 0.078 Average STD of innovations to income
ρs 0.903 Persistence of the income-innovation variance, σ2h
σs 0.277 Conditional STD (log scale) of σ2h
Notes: All values are adapted to the quarterly frequency of the model. For
details on the estimation see Appendix B.
5.2 Preferences and Technology
While we can estimate the income process directly from the data, all other parameters
are calibrated within the model. Table 3.1 summarizes our calibration. In detail, we
choose the parameter values as follows.
Households
For the felicity function, u = 11−ξx
1−ξ, we set the coefficient of relative risk aversion
ξ = 4, as in Kaplan and Violante (2014). The time-discount factor, β, and the asset
market participation frequency, ν, are jointly calibrated to match the ratios of liquid
and illiquid assets to output. We equate illiquid assets to all capital goods at current
replacement values. This implies for the total value of illiquid assets relative to nominal
GDP a capital-to-output ratio of 286%. In our baseline calibration, this implies an
annual real return for illiquid assets of 3.2%. We equate liquid assets to claims of the
private sector against the government and not to inside money, because the net value of
inside claims does not change with inflation. Specifically, we look at average U.S. federal
debt for the years 1980 to 2012 held by domestic private agents plus the monetary base.
This yields an annual money-to-output ratio of 32%. For details on the steady-state
asset distribution, see Appendix C. The calibrated participation frequency ν = 4.25% is
close to Kaplan and Violante’s estimate for working households in their state-dependent
participation framework. We take a conservative value for the inverse Frisch elasticity
of labor supply, γ = 2, corresponding to the estimates by microeconometric studies.
We provide a robustness check with an estimate of the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor
supply, γ = 1, which follows the New Keynesian literature (Chetty et al. (2011)).
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Table 1.2: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Value Description Target
Households
β 0.987 Discount factor K/Y = 286% (annual)
ν 4.25% Participation frequency M/Y = 32% (annual)
ξ 4 Coefficient of rel. risk av. Kaplan and Violante (2014)
γ 2 Inverse of Frisch elasticity Standard value
Intermediate Goods
α 0.73 Share of labor Income share of labor of 2/3
δ 1.35% Depreciation rate NIPA: Fixed assets
Final Goods
κ 0.09 Price stickiness Mean price duration of 4 quarters
µ 0.10 Markup 10% markup (standard value)
Capital Goods
φ 220 Capital adjustment costs Relative investment volatility of 3
Monetary Policy (Friedman’s k% rule)
θ1 1.005 Money growth 2% p.a.
θ2 0 Reaction to inflation deviations
θ3 0 Persistence in money growth
Intermediate, Final, and Capital Goods Producers
We parameterize the production function of the intermediate good producer according
to the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). In the U.S. economy the
income share of labor is about 2/3. Accounting for profits we hence set α = 0.73.
To calibrate the parameters of the entrepreneurs’ problem, we use standard values for
markup and price stickiness that are widely employed in the New Keynesian literature.
The Phillips curve parameter κ implies an average price duration of 4 quarters, assuming
flexible capital at the firm level. The steady-state marginal costs, exp(−µ) = 0.91,
imply a markup of 10%. The entrepreneurs’ and households’ discount factor are equal.
We calibrate the adjustment cost of capital, φ = 220, to match an investment to
output volatility of 3.
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Table 1.3: Alternative monetary policy rules
Parameter Value Description Target
Inflation Stabilization
θ1 1.005 Money growth 2% p.a.
θ2 1000 Reaction to inflation deviations No deviations from target
θ3 0 Persistence in money growth
Fed Policy Rule (Post-1980)
θ1 1.005 Money growth 2% p.a.
θ2 0.35 Reaction to inflation deviations Chowdhury and Schabert (2008)
θ3 0.9 Persistence in money growth Chowdhury and Schabert (2008)
Notes: For the Fed policy rule as well as all robustness checks, we recalibrate the discount factor
and the participation frequency of households to match the targeted capital and money to output
ratios and the capital adjustment costs to match a relative investment volatility of 3.
Central Bank
We set the average growth rate of money, θ1, such that our model produces an average
annual inflation rate of 2%, in line with the usual inflation targets of central banks
and roughly equal to average inflation in the U.S. between 1980 and 2012. To simplify
the dynamics of the model and for expositional purpose, we assume in our baseline
setup that the central bank follows Friedman’s k% rule and hence set θ2 and θ3 to
0. Alternatively, we consider two additional policy rules, see Table 1.3. First, we set
θ2 = 1000 and θ3 = 0, to examine uncertainty shocks without movements in the price
level. Second, we calibrate towards the post-1980s money supply rule of the Federal
Reserve as estimated in Chowdhury and Schabert (2008) to quantify the contribution
of uncertainty shocks to the U.S. business cycle over this period. This implies θ2 = 0.35
and θ3 = 0.9.14
6. Quantitative Results
6.1 Household Portfolios and the Individual Response to Uncertainty
In our model, households hold money because it provides better short-term consumption
smoothing than capital, as the latter can only be traded infrequently. This value of
14Originally, Chowdhury and Schabert report Taylor rules for money including a reaction to the
output gap. We obtain θ2 = 0.35 by using the Phillips curve from our model to eliminate the output
gap.
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Figure 1.2: Share of liquid assets in total net worth against percentiles of wealth
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Notes: For graphical illustration we make use of an Epanechnikov Kernel-
weighted local linear smoother with bandwidth 0.15. For the definition of
net liquid assets see Figure 1.1.
liquidity decreases in the amount of money a household holds, because a household rich
in liquid assets will likely be able to tap into its illiquid wealth before running down
all liquid wealth. For this reason, richer households, who typically hold both more
money and more capital, hold less liquid portfolios. The poorest households, on the
contrary, hold almost all their wealth in the liquid asset. This holds true in the actual
data as well as in our model. While our model matches relatively well the shape of
the actual liquidity share of household portfolios at all wealth percentiles, it slightly
underestimates the share of liquid assets for the lowest deciles; see Figure 1.2, which
compares our model to the Survey of Consumer Finances 2004.
So what happens to total savings and its composition when uncertainty increases?
In response to the increase in income uncertainty, households aim for higher precau-
tionary savings to be in a better position to smooth their consumption. Since the liquid
asset is better suited to this purpose, households first increase their demand for this
asset – in fact, they even reduce holdings of the illiquid asset to increase the liquidity of
their portfolio. Figure 1.3 shows how households’ portfolio composition and consump-
tion policy react to an increase in uncertainty without imposing any market clearing.
The top panels displays the relative change in the consumption and portfolio liquidity
compared to the average uncertainty state. For this exercise, we evaluate households’
consumption policies and the portfolio choice of adjusters and non-adjusters after a 2
standard deviation shock to uncertainty, increasing the variance of idiosyncratic income
shocks by 55%. We here perform a partial equilibrium analysis and compute the policies
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Figure 1.3: Partial equilibrium response – Change in individual policy upon an uncer-
tainty shock keeping prices and expectations constant at steady-state values
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Notes: Top Panels: Reaction of individual consumption demand and portfolio liquidity of
adjusters and non-adjusters at constant prices and price expectations relative to the respec-
tive counterpart at average uncertainty. The policies are averaged using frequency weights
from the steady-state wealth distribution and reported conditional on a household falling
into the x-th wealth percentile. High uncertainty corresponds to a two standard deviation
shock, which is equal to a 55% increase in uncertainty.
Bottom Panels: Fraction of total demand change for money and capital accounted for by all
households in a given percentile of the wealth dristribution.
As with the data, we use an Epanechnikov Kernel-weighted local linear smoother with band-
width 0.15.
under the expectation that all prices are at their steady-state values isolating hence the
direct effect of income uncertainty. Across all wealth levels, households wish to increase
their savings (i.e., decrease their consumption) as well as the liquidity of their portfolios
when uncertainty goes up. Adjusters can do so by tipping into their capital account
and thus their consumption falls less. This flight to liquidity leads to falling demand
for capital even though total savings increase.
The bottom panels of Figure 1.3 display the contribution of each wealth percentile
to the total change in demand for money and capital. Values above (below) one imply
that a certain percentile of the wealth distribution is contributing more (less) than
proportionally. We find that almost all wealth groups are equally important for the
change in total asset demand. In other words, poorer households, while making up a
23
Figure 1.4: General equilibrium response – Change in the liquidity of household port-
folios
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Notes: Change in the distribution of liquidity at all percentiles of the wealth distribution
at equilibrium prices and price expectations for s = {1, 8} quarters after a two standard
deviation shock to income uncertainty. The liquidity of the portfolios is averaged using
frequency weights from the steady-state wealth distribution and reported conditional on
a household falling into the x-th wealth percentile. The left-hand panel shows the change
including changes in prices; the right-hand panel shows the pure quantity responses.
As with the data, we use an Epanechnikov Kernel-weighted local linear smoother with
bandwidth 0.15.
smaller fraction of total asset demand, observe larger changes in their asset positions
and hence are as important as richer households for the aggregate demand changes.
The change in the liquidity of household portfolios in general equilibrium is displayed
in Figure 1.4; the left-hand panel shows the change in value terms; the right-hand panel
shows the change in quantities, i.e., at constant prices. Portfolio liquidity initially
increases at all wealth levels – in particular in value terms because the price of illiquid
assets drops sharply as we will see in the next section. The increase in the share of
liquid assets is least pronounced for the poorest, because of the negative income effect.
After two years, the increase in liquidity is concentrated at households somewhat below
median wealth. By then, rich households have partially reversed their portfolio shares
as they also increase their savings in physical capital, exploiting lower capital prices.
Interestingly, this picture is exactly what we found in Figure 1.1, where the increase in
the liquidity of the portfolios is strongest for the lower middle class. Only the magnitude
of changes in the liquidity of household portfolios during the Great Recession is much
more dramatic.
6.2 Aggregate Consequences of Uncertainty Shocks
Main Findings
This simultaneous decrease in the demand for consumption and capital upon an increase
in uncertainty leads to a decline in output. Figure 1.5 displays the impulse responses of
output and its components, real balances and the capital stock as well as asset prices
and returns for our baseline calibration. The assumed monetary policy follows a strict
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Figure 1.5: Uncertainty shock under constant money growth
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Impulse responses to a 2 standard deviation increase in the variance of idiosyncratic
productivity. We generate these impulses by averaging over 100.000 independent simu-
lations of the law of motions, Equations 1.18 and 1.19, that simultaneously receive the
shock in T = 500. All rates (inflation, dividends, etc.) are not annualized.
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money growth rule, i.e., it is not responsive to inflation. After a two standard deviation
increase in the variance of idiosyncratic productivity shocks, output drops on impact
by 0.5% and only returns to the normal growth path after roughly 20 quarters. Over
the first year the output drop is 0.37% on average.
The output drop in our model results from households increasing their precautionary
savings in conjunction with a portfolio adjustment toward the liquid asset. In times
of high uncertainty, households dislike illiquid assets because of their limited use for
short-run consumption smoothing. Conversely, the price of capital decreases on impact
by 4%. Since the demand for the liquid asset is a demand for paper and not for
(investment) goods, demand for both consumption and investment goods falls.
This decrease in demand puts pressure on prices. Inflation falls by 65 basis points
on impact, increasing the average markup in the economy. Thus, the marginal return
on capital, rt, and consequently investment demand decline, while the return on money
goes up. Thereby, the flight to liquidity increases the relative return of money, which
further amplifies the portfolio adjustment. In line with the excess stock volatility puzzle,
uncertainty shocks move capital prices and expected returns much more (and in the
opposite direction) than they move dividends (65 vs. -4 basis points, quarterly).
Stabilization Policy
How much of this is driven by the increased value of liquidity, and how much by the
differential impact of disinflation on the return of money and on dividends? We can
isolate the flight to liquidity from the effect of the change in relative returns by looking at
a monetary policy that is stabilizing the economy – setting θ2 = 1000, θ3 = 0. Under this
policy, inflation is fixed and output barely moves. Also dividends are virtually constant.
Thus, the relative-return effect vanishes in the case of strict inflation targeting. The
corresponding impulse responses are displayed in Figure 1.6. As a consequence of the
stabilization, the price of capital falls less, but it still falls by more than 2%. The
expected return on capital increases by about 50 basis points. The total income of
households almost stays constant in the first 5 years and hence money demand peaks
at an even higher level than without stabilization.
In other words, the portfolio adjustment is to a large extent driven by a flight
to liquidity. After roughly 2.5 years, real balances have increased to a point where
households are well insured and want to increase their holdings of the illiquid asset
again.
Quantitative Importance: Fed Policy Rule
Figure 1.7 displays the aggregate consequences of shocks to household income risk using
the Fed’s post-1980’s money supply reaction function as estimated by Chowdhury and
Schabert (2008). The results are roughly half way between perfect stabilization and
constant money growth.
How Important Is the (Il)liquidity of Capital?
Our calibration suggests that households can adjust their capital holdings on average
every 23.5 quarters. This restricted access to savings in capital limits its use for short-
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Figure 1.6: Uncertainty shock under inflation stabilization
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Impulse responses to a 2 standard deviation increase in the variance of idiosyncratic
productivity. We generate these impulses by averaging over 100.000 independent simu-
lations of the law of motions, Equations 1.18 and 1.19, that simultaneously receive the
shock in T = 500. All rates (inflation, dividends, etc.) are not annualized.
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Figure 1.7: Uncertainty shock under Fed’s post-80’s reaction function as estimated in
Chowdhury and Schabert (2008)
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Impulse responses to a 2 standard deviation increase in the variance of idiosyncratic
productivity. We generate these impulses by averaging over 100.000 independent simu-
lations of the law of motions, Equations 1.18 and 1.19, that simultaneously receive the
shock in T = 500. All rates (inflation, dividends, etc.) are not annualized.
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Figure 1.8: Uncertainty shock with liquid capital (ν = 35%)
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Impulse responses to a 2 standard deviation increase in the variance of idiosyncratic
productivity. We generate these impulses by averaging over 100.000 independent simu-
lations of the law of motions, Equations 1.18 and 1.19, that simultaneously receive the
shock in T = 500. All rates (inflation, dividends, etc.) are not annualized.
run consumption smoothing considerably. If capital were easier to access, it would
become more and more of a substitute for money in terms of its use for consumption
smoothing. Hence, aggregate money holdings decline as ν increases. Figure 1.8 plots the
impulse responses for an average adjustment frequency of less than a year (ν = 35%). In
this case money holdings are only 8.5% of annual output on average, which corresponds
to the U.S. monetary base.15
Figure 1.8 shows that the output drop is very similar with a higher portfolio adjust-
ment frequency, although the share of money in the economy is significantly smaller
and capital is very liquid in comparison to the baseline calibration. Money demand
reacts more elastically to uncertainty as more households are able to adjust their port-
folio. Consequently, the flight to liquidity is stronger and happens faster than with
15We use the St. Louis Fed adjusted annual monetary base from 1980 to 2012.
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more illiquid capital – in the build-up and in the reverse.
In summary, the macroeconomic effects of uncertainty shocks are robust to changes
in ν. While in the limit with perfectly liquid capital money is driven out of the economy,
the economy seems to not converge toward the “Aiyagari” economy without money and
perfectly liquid capital. In the “Aiyagari” case, investment replaces consumption de-
mand one-for-one when uncertainty hits. As long as households hold even tiny amounts
of money for liquidity-consumption smoothing reasons, the value of money increases
with income uncertainty and money demand is higher in uncertain times, which creates
deflationary pressures.
In other words, and more generally speaking, uncertainty shocks will affect aggregate
demand negatively only if they trigger precautionary savings in paper and not in real
assets. In our model, it is the increased value of liquidity that is responsible for the
portfolio adjustment toward money.
6.3 Redistributive and Welfare Effects
So far we have described the aggregate dimension of an uncertainty shock and its
repercussions. Since such shocks affect the price level, asset prices, dividends, and
wages differently, our model predicts that not all agents (equally) lose from the decline
in consumption upon an uncertainty shock. For example, if capital prices fall, those
agents that are rich in human capital but hold little physical capital could actually gain
from the uncertainty shock. These agents are net savers. They increase their holdings
of physical capital and can do so now more cheaply.
To quantify and understand the relative welfare consequences of the uncertainty
shock and of systematic policy response, one would normally just look at the change
in a household’s value function. However, since solving directly for the value function
is prohibitively time consuming in our model, we instead simulate and compare two
sets of economies: one where the uncertainty state simply evolves according to its
Markov chain properties and another set where, at time T , we exogenously increase
income uncertainty, σ2ht, by setting the shock to uncertainty to T = 2σs, a 2 standard
deviation increase. We then let the economies evolve stochastically. We trace agents
over the next S periods for both sets of economies, and track their period-felicity uiT+t
to calculate for each agent with individual state (h,m, k) in period T the discounted
expected felicity stream over the next S periods as:
vS(h,m, k) = E
[
S∑
t=0
βtuT+t
∣∣∣∣∣(hT ,mT , kT ) = (h,m, k)
]
,
where uT+t is the felicity stream in period T + t under the household’s optimal saving
policy. For large S, vS approximates the actual household’s value function.
We then determine an equivalent consumption tax that households would be willing
to face over the next S quarters in order to eliminate the uncertainty shock at time T
as:
CE =
(
vshockS
vno shockS
)1/(1−ξ)
− 1. (1.20)
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Figure 1.9: Welfare after 5 years
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Notes: Welfare costs in terms of consumption equivalents (CE) as defined in
(1.20). The graphs refer to the conditional expectations of CE with respect to
the two displayed dimensions, respectively. The missing dimension has been in-
tegrated out. Capital and money are reported in terms of quarterly income.
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Table 1.4: Welfare after 5 years
Policy regime: Constant money growth
Quintiles of money holdings Quintiles of capital holdings
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Conditional -0.92 -0.73 -0.55 -0.38 -0.18 -0.53 -0.47 -0.51 -0.55 -0.61
Median -0.96 -0.78 -0.57 -0.35 -0.02 -0.63 -0.59 -0.61 -0.64 -0.69
Quintiles of Human Capital
Conditional -0.62 -0.62 -0.58 -0.45 -0.43
Median -0.59 -0.61 -0.60 -0.52 -0.58
Policy regime: Inflation stabilization
Quintiles of money holdings Quintiles of capital holdings
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Conditional -0.21 -0.39 -0.39 -0.35 -0.31 -0.43 -0.36 -0.32 -0.29 -0.25
Median -0.41 -0.42 -0.37 -0.29 -0.14 -0.57 -0.45 -0.37 -0.31 -0.20
Quintiles of human capital
Conditional -0.08 -0.22 -0.35 -0.40 -0.53
Median -0.09 -0.22 -0.39 -0.45 -0.62
Policy regime: Fed reaction function
Quintiles of money holdings Quintiles of capital holdings
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Conditional -0.56 -0.55 -0.47 -0.36 -0.26 -0.48 -0.42 -0.41 -0.42 -0.43
Median -0.71 -0.61 -0.47 -0.32 -0.09 -0.60 -0.52 -0.50 -0.47 -0.45
Quintiles of human capital
Conditional -0.34 -0.42 -0.46 -0.42 -0.48
Median -0.32 -0.42 -0.49 -0.48 -0.60
Notes: Welfare costs in terms of consumption equivalents (CE) as defined in (1.20).
Conditional refers to integrating out the missing dimensions, whereas Median refers to
median asset holdings of the respective other assets. We track households over 20 quarters
and average over 100 independent model simulations.
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Figure 1.9 displays the relative differences in vS for S = 20 quarters in terms of
consumption equivalents, CE, between the two sets of simulations of the economy. This
time horizon captures the welfare consequences of the recession following the uncertainty
shock. See Appendix E for an assessment of welfare after more than 75 years, when the
initial position, (hT ,mT , kT ), has washed out in the sense that the conditional and the
unconditional distributions are almost identical. Of course, in the long run there are
no differences between the two sets of economies.
On average, households would be willing to forgo roughly 0.41% of their consumption
over 5 years to eliminate the uncertainty shock. This average loss masks heterogeneous
effects across households with different asset positions and human capital. While mone-
tary policy can reduce the cost to roughly 0.25% on average, it also shifts the burden of
the shock between households. Figure 1.9 displays the expected welfare costs of house-
holds conditioning on two of the three dimensions of the (h,m, k)-space – integrating
out the missing dimension.
Without stabilization, money rich and physical asset poor households lose the least.
These are households that typically acquire physical capital in exchange for their money
holdings, and they can do so at favorable capital prices after the uncertainty shock. For
a similar reason, the steepness of the gradient in human capital is relatively modest.
After the shock, human capital rich households suffer from lower wages, but as savers
they are partly compensated, because they can acquire physical capital at lower prices.
Table 1.4 summarizes the figures numerically. In this table, we condition on just one
dimension of the households’ portfolio, and display the average relative welfare gains.
We do so in two ways: First, we calculate welfare conditional on one asset taking the
conditional distribution of the other two assets into account. Second, we also report
welfare effects at median asset holdings of the respective other assets. The latter isolates
the direct effect in the dimension of interest.
Table 1.4 and Figure 1.9 shows that the intervention of the central bank helps
households with high amounts of physical assets. In particular wealthy agents with
low human capital profit the most from stabilization. Conversely, the capital poor but
human-capital rich households profit the least from stabilization, because it is them who
finance the increased money supply and they comparatively suffer from stable prices
for the physical asset.
7. Conclusion
This paper examines how variations in uncertainty about household income affect the
macroeconomy through precautionary savings. For this purpose we develop a novel
and tractable framework that combines nominal rigidities and incomplete markets in
which households choose portfolios of liquid paper and illiquid physical assets – merg-
ing incomplete markets with wealthy hand-to-mouth consumers and New Keynesian
modeling. In this model, higher uncertainty about income triggers a flight to liquid-
ity because it is superior for short-run consumption smoothing. This reduces not only
consumption but also investment and hence depresses economic activity.
Calibrating the model to match the evolution of uncertainty about household income
in the U.S., we find that a spike in income uncertainty can lead to substantive output,
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consumption, and investment losses. This may help us to understand the slow recovery
of the U.S. economy during the Great Recession, for which we document a shift toward
liquid assets across all percentiles of the U.S. wealth distribution. We find that a two
standard deviation increase in household income uncertainty generates output losses
that are sizable.
The welfare effects of such uncertainty shocks crucially depend on a household’s
asset position and the stance of monetary policy. Monetary policy that drastically
increases the money supply in times of increased uncertainty limits the negative welfare
effects of uncertainty shocks but redistributes from the asset poor to the asset rich.
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Appendices
A. Dynamic Planning Problem with Two Assets
The dynamic planning problem of a household in the model is characterized by two
Bellman equations, Va in the case where the household can adjust its capital holdings
and Vn otherwise
Va(m, k, h; Θ, s) =maxk′,m′a∈Γau[x(m,m
′
a, k, k
′, h)]
+ β [νEV a(m′a, k′, h′,Θ′, s′) + (1− ν)EV n(m′a, k′, h′,Θ′, s′)]
Vn(m, k, h; Θ, s) =maxm′n∈Γnu[x(m,m
′
n, k, k, h)]
+ β [νEV a(m′n, k, h′,Θ′, s′) + (1− ν)EV n(m′n, k, h′,Θ′, s′)] (1.21)
where the budget sets are given by
Γa(m, k, h; Θ, s) = {m′, k′ ≥ 0|q(Θ, s)(k′ − k) +m′ ≤ γ1 + γw(Θ, s)hN + r(Θ, s)k +
m
pi(Θ, s)}
(1.22)
Γn(m, k, h; Θ, s) = {m′ ≥ 0|m′ ≤ γ1 + γw(Θ, s)hN + r(Θ, s)k +
m
pi(Θ, s)} (1.23)
x(m,m′, k, k′, h) = γ1 + γw(Θ, s)hN + r(Θ, s)k +
m
pi(Θ, s) − q(Θ, s)(k
′ − k)−m′
(1.24)
To save on notation, let Ω be the set of possible idiosyncratic state variables controlled
by the household, let Z be the set of potential aggregate states, let Γi : Ω→ Ω be the
correspondence describing the feasibility constraints, and let Ai(z) = {(ω, y) ∈ Ω× Ω :
y ∈ Γi(ω, z)} be the graph of Γi. Hence the states and controls of the household problem
can be defined as
Ω ={ω = (m, k) ∈ R2+ : m, k ≤ ∞} (1.25)
z ={h,Θ, s} (1.26)
and the return function F : A→ R reads:
F (Γi(ω, z), ω; z) =
x1−γi
1− γ (1.27)
Define the value before the adjustment/non-adjustment shock realizes as
v(ω, z) := νVa(ω, z) + (1− ν)Vn(ω, z).
Now we can rewrite the optimization problem of the household in terms of the
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definitions above in a compact form:
Va(ω, z) = max
y∈Γa(ω,z)
[F (ω, y; z) + βwEv(y, z′)] (1.28)
Vn(ω, z) = max
y∈Γn(ω,z)
[F (ω, y; z) + βwEv(y, z′)]. (1.29)
Finally we define the mapping T : C(Ω) → C(Ω), where C(Ω) is the space of
bounded, continuous and weakly concave functions.
(Tv)(ω, z) = νVa(ω, z) + (1− ν)Vn(ω, z) (1.30)
Va(ω, z) = max
y∈Γa(ω,z)
[F (ω, y; z) + βwEv(y, z′)]
Vn(ω, z) = max
y∈Γn(ω,z)
[F (ω, y; z) + βwEv(y, z′)].
A.1 Properties of Primitives
The following properties of the primitives of the problem obviously hold:
P 1. Properties of sets Ω,Γa(ω, z),Γn(ω, z)
1. Ω is a convex subset of R3.
2. Γi(·, z) : Ω→ Ω is non-empty, compact-valued, continuous, monotone and convex
for all z.
P 2. Properties of return function F
F is bounded, continuous, strongly concave, C2 differentiable on the interior of A,
and strictly increasing in each of its first two arguments.
A.2 Properties of the Value and Policy Functions
Lemma 1. The mapping T defined by the Bellman equation for v fulfills Blackwell’s
sufficient conditions for a contraction on the set of bounded, continuous and weakly
concave functions C(Ω).
a) It satisfies discounting.
b) It is monotonic.
c) It preserves boundedness (assuming an arbitrary maximum consumption level).
d) It preserves strict concavity.
Hence, the solution to the Bellman equation is strictly concave. The policy is a single-
valued function in (m, k), and so is optimal consumption.
Proof. The proof proceeds item by item and closely follows Nancy L. Stokey (1989)
taking into account that the household problem in the extended model consists of two
Bellman equations.
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a) Discounting
Let a ∈ R+ and the rest be defined as above. Then it holds that:
(T (v + a))(ω, z) =ν max
y∈Γa(ω,z)
[F (ω, y, z) + βwEv(y, z′) + a]
+ (1− ν) max
y∈Γn(ω,z)
[F (ω, y, z) + βwEv(y, z′) + a]
=(Tv)(ω, z) + βwa
Accordingly, T fulfills discounting.
b) Monotonicity
Let g : Ω× Z → R2, f : Ω× Z → R2 and g(ω, z) ≥ f(ω, z) ∀ω, z ∈ Ω× Z, then
it follows that:
(Tg)(ω, z) =ν max
y∈Γa(ω,z)
[F (ω, y, z) + βwEg(y, z′)]
+ (1− ν) max
y∈Γn(ω,z)
[F (ω, y, z) + βwEg(y, z′)]
≥ν max
y∈Γa(ω,z)
[F (ω, y, z) + βwEf(y, z′)]
+ (1− ν) max
y∈Γn(ω,z)
[F (ω, y, z) + βwEf(y, z′)]
=Tf(ω, z)
The objective function for which Tg is the maximized value is uniformly higher
than the function for which Tf is the maximized value. Therefore, T preserves
monotonicity.
c) Boundedness
From properties P1 it follows that the mapping T defines a maximization prob-
lem over the continuous and bounded function [F (ω, y) + βwEv(y, z′))] over the
compact sets Γi(ω, z) for i = {a, n}. Hence the maximum is attained. Since F
and v are bounded, Tv is also bounded.
d) Strict Concavity
Let f ∈ C ′′(Ω), where C ′′ is the set of bounded, continuous, strictly concave
functions on Ω. Since the convex combination of two strictly concave functions
is strictly concave, it is sufficient to show that Ti[C ′′(Ω)] ⊆ C ′′(Ω), where Ti is
defined by
Tiv = max
y∈Γi(ω,z)
[F (ω, y, z) + βwEv(y, z′)], i ∈ {a, n}
Let ω0 6= ω1, θ ∈ (0, 1), ωθ = θω0 + (1− θ)ω1.
Let yj ∈ Γi(ωj, z) be the maximizer of (Tif)(ωj) for j = {0, 1} and i = {a, n},
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yθ = θy0 + (1− θ)y1.
(Tif)(ωθ, z) ≥[F (ωθ, yθ, z) + βwEf(yθ, z′)]
>θ[F (ω0, y0, z) + βwEf(y0, z′))] + (1− θ)[F (ω1, y1, z) + βwEf(y1, z′)]
=θ(Tf)(ω0, z) + (1− θ)(Tf)(ω1, z)
The first inequality follows from yθ being feasible because of convex budget sets.
The second inequality follows from the strict concavity of f . Since ω0 and ω1
are arbitrary, it follows that Tif is strictly concave, and since f is arbitrary that
T [C ′′(Ω)] ⊆ C ′′(Ω).
Lemma 2. The value function is C2 and the policy function C1 differentiable.
Proof. The properties of the choice set P1, of the return function P2, and the properties
of the value function proven in (1) fulfill the assumptions of Santos’s (1991) theorem on
the differentiability of the policy function. According to the theorem, the value function
is C2 and the policy function C1 differentiable.
Note that strong concavity of the return function holds for CRRA utility, because of
the arbitrary maximum we set for consumption.
Lemma 3. The total savings S∗i := m∗i (ω, z) + q(z)k∗i (ω, z) and consumption c∗i , i ∈
{a, n} are increasing in ω if r(z) is positive. In the adjustment case total savings and
consumption are increasing in total resources Ra = [q(z)+r(z)]k+m/pi(z) for any r(z).
Proof. Define v˜(S, z) := max{m,k|m+q(z)k≤S}Ev(m, k; z′) and resources in the case of no
adjustment Rn = r(z)k +m/pi(z). Since v is strictly concave and increasing, so is v˜ by
the line of the proof of Lemma 1.d). Now we can (re)write the planning problem as
Va(m, k; z) = max
S≤ γ1+γw(z)hN+Ra
[u( γ1 + γw(z)hN + [q(z) + r(z)]k +m/pi(z)− S) + βW v˜(S, z)]
Vn(m, k; z) = max
m′≤ γ1+γw(z)hN+Rn
[u( γ1 + γw(z)hN + r(z)k +m/pi(z)−m
′) + βWEv(m′, k; z′)].
Due to differentiability we obtain the following (sufficient) first-order conditions:
∂u
(
γ
1+γw(z)hN + [q(z) + r(z)]k +m/pi(z)− S
)
∂c
= βW
∂v˜(S, z)
∂S
∂u
(
γ
1+γw(z)hN + r(z)k +m/pi(z)−m′
)
∂c
= βW
∂v(m′, k; z)
∂m′
. (1.31)
Since the left-hand sides are decreasing in ω = (m, k), and increasing in S (respectively
m′), and the right-hand side is decreasing in S (respectivelym′), S∗i =
{
qk′ +m′ if i = a
qk +m′ if i = n
must be increasing in ω.
Since the right-hand side of (1.31) is hence decreasing in ω, so must be the left-hand
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side of (1.31). Hence consumption must be increasing in ω.
The last statement follows directly from the same proof.
A.3 Euler Equations
Denote the optimal policies for consumption, for money holdings and capital as x∗i ,m∗i , k∗, i ∈
{a, n} respectively. The first-order conditions for an inner solution in the (non-)adjustment
case read:
k∗ :∂u(x
∗
a)
∂x
q =βE
[
ν
∂Va(m∗a, k∗; z′)
∂k
+ (1− ν)∂Vn(m
′
a, k
′; z′)
∂k
]
(1.32)
m∗a :
∂u(x∗a)
∂x
=βE
[
ν
∂Va(m∗a, k∗; z′)
∂m
+ (1− ν)∂Vn(m
∗
a, k
∗; z′)
∂m
]
(1.33)
m∗n :
∂u(x∗n)
∂x
=βE
[
ν
∂Va(m∗n, k; z′)
∂m
+ (1− ν)∂Vn(m
∗
n, k; z′)
∂m
]
(1.34)
Note the subtle difference between (1.33) and (1.34), which lies in the different capital
stocks k′ vs. k in the right-hand side expressions.
Differentiating the value functions with respect to k and m, we obtain:
∂Va(m, k; z)
∂k
= ∂u[x
∗
a(m, k; z)]
∂x
(q(z) + r(z)) (1.35)
∂Va(m, k; z)
∂m
= ∂u[x
∗
a(m, k; z)]
∂x
pi(z)−1 (1.36)
∂Vn(m, k; z)
∂m
= ∂u[x
∗
n(m, k; z)]
∂x
pi(z)−1 (1.37)
∂Vn(m, k; z)
∂k
= r(z)∂u[x
∗
n(m, k; z)]
∂x
(1.38)
+ βE
[
ν
∂Va[m∗n(m, k; z), k; z′]
∂k
+ (1− ν)∂V
n[m∗n(m, k; z), k; z′]
∂k
]
= r(z)∂u[x
∗
n(m, k; z)]
∂x
+ βνE∂u{x
∗
a[m∗n(m, k; z), k; z], k; z′}
∂x
(q(z′) + r(z′))
+ β(1− ν)E∂Vn{[m
∗
n(m, k; z), k; z], k; z′}
∂k
such that the marginal value of capital in non-adjustment is defined recursively.
Now we can plug the second set of equations into the first set of equations and
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obtain the following Euler equations (in slightly shortened notation):
∂u[x∗a(m, k; z)]
∂x
q(z) =βE
[
ν
∂u[x∗a(m∗a, k∗; z′)]
∂x
[q(z′) + r(z′)] + (1− ν)∂V
n(m∗a, k′; z′)
∂k′
]
(1.39)
∂u[x∗a(m, k; z)]
∂x
=βEpi′(z′)−1
[
ν
∂u[x∗a(m∗a, k∗; z′)]
∂x
+ (1− ν)∂u[x
∗
n(m∗a, k′; z′)]
∂x
]
(1.40)
∂u[x∗n(m, k, ; z)]
∂x
=βEpi′(z′)−1
[
ν
∂u[x∗a(m′n, k; z′)]
∂x
+ (1− ν)∂u[x
∗
n(m∗n, k; z′)]
∂x
]
(1.41)
A.4 Algorithm
The algorithm we use to solve for optimal policies given the Krusell-Smith forecasting
rules is a version of Hintermaier and Koeniger’s (2010) extension of the endogenous grid
method, originally developed by Carroll (2006).
It works iteratively until convergence of policies as follows: Start with some guess
for the policy functions x∗a and x∗n on a given grid (m, k) ∈M ×K. Define the shadow
value of capital
β−1ψ(m, k; z) :=νE
{
∂u{x∗a[m∗n(m, k, z), k; z′]}
∂x
[q(z′) + r(z′)]
}
(1.42)
+ (1− ν)E∂Vn[m
∗
n(m, k, z), k; z′]
∂k
= νE
{
∂u{x∗a[m∗n(m, k, z), k; z′]}
∂x
[q(z′) + r(z′)]
}
+ (1− ν)E
{
∂u{x∗n(m∗n(m, k, z), k; z′)]
∂x
r(z′)
}
+ (1− ν)E {ψ[m∗n(m, k, z), k; z′]} .
Guess initially ψ = 0. Then
1. Solve for an update of x∗n by standard endogenous grid methods using equation
(1.41), and denote m∗n(m, k; z) as the optimal money holdings without capital
adjustment.
2. Find for every k′ on-grid some (off-grid) value of m˜∗a(k′; z) such that combining
(1.40) and (1.39) yields:
0 = νE
{
∂u[x∗a(m˜∗a(k′, z), k′; z′)]
∂x
[
q(z′) + r(z′)
q(z) − pi(z
′)−1
]}
(1.43)
+ (1− ν)E
{
∂u[x∗n(m˜∗a(k′, z), k′; z′)]
∂x
[
r(z′)
q(z) − pi(z
′)−1
]}
+ (1− ν)E
[
ψ(m˜∗a(k′, z), k′; z′)
q(z)
]
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N.B. that Eψ takes the stochastic transitions in h′ into account and does not
replace the expectations operator in the definition of ψ. If no solution exists,
set m˜∗a = 0. Uniqueness (conditional on existence) of m˜∗a follows from the strict
concavity of v.
3. Solve for total initial resources, by solving the Euler equation (1.40) for x˜∗(k′, z),
such that:
x˜∗(k′, z)
= ∂u
∂x
−1 {
βEpi(z′)−1
[
ν
∂u{x∗a[m∗a(k′, z), k′; z′]}
∂x
+ (1− ν)∂u{x
∗
n[m∗a(k′, z), k′; z′]
∂x
]}
(1.44)
where the right-hand side expressions are obtained by interpolating x∗a(m∗a(k′, z), k′, z′)
from the on-grid guesses x∗a(m, k; z) and taking expected values with respect to
z′.
This way we obtain total non-human resources R˜a(k′, z) that are compatible with
plans (m∗(k′), k′) and a consumption policy ˜˜x∗a(R˜a(k′, z), z) in total resources.
4. Since (consumption) policies are increasing in resources, we can obtain consump-
tion policy updates as follows: Calculate total resources for each (m, k) pair
Ra(m, k) = (q+r)k+m/pi and use the consumption policy obtained before to up-
date x∗a(m, k, z) by interpolating atRa(m, k) from the set
{
(˜˜x∗a(R˜a(k′, z), z), Ra(k′, z))
∣∣∣k′ ∈ K}.16
5. Update ψ: Calculate a new value of ψ using (1.38), such that:
ψnew(m, k, z) =βνE
{
∂u{x∗a[m∗n(m, k, z), k; z′]}
∂x
[q(z′) + r(z′)]
}
+ β(1− ν)E
{
∂u{x∗n(m∗n(m, k, z), k; z′)]
∂x
r(z′)
}
+ β(1− ν)E
{
ψold[m∗n(m, k, z), k; z′]
}
. (1.45)
making use of the updated consumption policies.
B. Estimation of the Stochastic Volatility Process for
Household Income
B.1 Income Process
We assume that the observed log-income of a household, yi,a,t, is composed of four
components: a deterministic part f(oi,a,t), a transitory part τi,a,t, a persistent part
16If a boundary solution m˜∗(0) > 0 is found, we use the “n” problem to obtain consumption policies
for resources below m˜∗(0).
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hi,a,t, and a permanent part µi such that:
yi,a,t = f(oi,a,t) + y∗i,a,t, (1.46)
y∗i,a,t = τi,a,t + hi,a,t + µi, (1.47)
hi,a,t = ρhhi,a−1,t−1 + i,a,t, (1.48)
where oi,a,t is observable characteristics of the household’s head, y∗i,a,t is the stochastic
component of a household’s income (“residual income”), t is calendar time, and a is
the household’s years of labor market experience. We assume that all households start
with hi,0,t = 0 when they enter the labor market.
For the shocks i,a,t to the persistent part h we assume them to be Gaussian, i,a,t ∼
N(0, σ,2t ), with a time-varying variance that follows an AR(1) process (in logs) plus
quadratic trend.
log σ,2t = (1− ρs)µs + ξ1t+ ξ2t2 + ρs log σ,2t−1 + εt, (1.49)
εt ∼ N(0, σ2s). (1.50)
For the variances of the fixed effect µi we assume them to be cohort specific, such
that µi ∼ N(0, σµ,2t−a), where t − a denotes the birth cohort. We assume the transitory
component, τi,a,t ∼ N(0, σ2τ ), to have a constant variance.
Income Variances
Under the above assumptions, the variance of residual income, y∗i,a,t, is given by
σy,2a,t = σ2τ + σ2µ,t−a + σ
h,2
a,t , (1.51)
σh,2a,t = ρ2hσ
h,2
a−1,t−1 + σ,2t ; σh,20,t = 0, (1.52)
log σ,2t = (1− ρs)µs + ξ1t+ ξ2t2 + ρs log σ,2t−1 + εt, εt ∼ N(0, σ2s). (1.53)
We use the above equations to identify the parameters governing the stochastic volatility
process, Equation (1.6), {ρh, ρs, σ¯, σ2s} from the data.17
B.2 Data
We take the 1970-2009 Cross-National Equivalent File (CNEF) of the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID) and drop the low income sample. We keep all households in
the sample that have at least two but no more than 10 household members who work
combined at least 1040 hours per year and a male household head no younger than 25
and not older than 55. We focus on the age of 25 to 55 to abstract from the effects of
household formation and retirement. We construct household income as pre-tax labor
income plus private and public transfers minus all taxes. These selection criteria yield
a sample that has on average about 1815 observations for each year of the survey.
17Where σ¯ = sqrt(exp(µs + σ
2
s
(1−ρ2s) ) corresponds to the level-mean of Equation (1.53).
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B.3 Estimation
Our estimation procedure proceeds in two steps. First we estimate the deterministic
component, f(oi,a,t) (Eq. (1.54)), by running an OLS regression of log household income
on time dummies, age dummies, schooling dummies interacted with up to a quadratic
age trend, and household size dummies.
f(oi,a,t) = θ0 + θT1 Dt + θT2 xi,a,t, (1.54)
where Dt is a vector of year dummy variables, t = {1970, ..., 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003,
2005, 2007, 2009}, and xi,a,t is a vector containing all remaining regressors for household
i with a years of labor market experience at date t. We eliminate any observation where
the residual of this regression, y∗i,a,t, belongs to the bottom or top per percent of all
residuals for an age group.
From the residuals of this regression, we then calculate the sample variance within an
age-year cell, s2a,t, across ages, a = {1, . . . , 31}, and times t as well as covariances c1a,t =
cov(y∗i,a,t, y∗i,a−1,t−1) and c2a,t = cov(y∗i,a,t, y∗i,a−2,t−2). This yields 992 sample-variance and
1798 sample-covariance estimates, where each estimate is constructed from on average
55 observations on the log-income residual.
Given the income process as laid out above, we can derive the moment conditions
corresponding to the estimates for empirical variance s2 and first and second order auto
covariances in residual household income c1, c2 for each age-year combination.
s2a,t = σ
µ,2
t−a + σ2τ +
a−1∑
j=1
ρ2jh σ
h,2
a−j,t−j + ψsa,t (1.55)
c1a,t = σ
µ,2
t−a + ρhσh,2a−1,t−1 + ψc1a,t (1.56)
c2a,t = σ
µ,2
t−a + ρ2hσ
h,2
a−2,t−2 + ψc2a,t (1.57)
where σh,2a,t obeys Equations (1.52) and (1.53) and ψ are the residuals.
B.4 Results
First-Stage Regression
The first-stage regression, Equation (1.54), controls for observable household charac-
teristics and hence filters out the deterministic cross-sectional variation in household
income. The results are comparable to existing studies, implying a concave earnings
function in age and education. The inclusion of age-education interactions as well as
controlling for age, education, and household size nonparametrically considerably raises
the R2 = 0.6.
The residuals of this regression yield the idiosyncratic component of income, y∗i,a,t,
from which we obtain the idiosyncratic cross-sectional variation in household income.
Figure 1.10 depicts the variance of idiosyncratic income by age averaged across 1970-
2009. The variance at labor market entry is already substantial and it increases by
about 50% after 30 years of labor market participation. The initial dispersion helps to
identify σ2τ + σ
µ,2
t−a, whereas the rate of increase contains information on σh,2a,t .
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Figure 1.10: Idiosyncratic cross-sectional variance by age
25 30 35 40 45 50 550.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
0.22
Age
R
es
id
u
a
l
V
a
ri
a
n
ce
s
2 a
Notes: Cross-sectional variance averaged across time
calculated from the residuals of the first-stage regression.
Parameter Estimates
We estimate the following parameters by the generalized method of moments (GMM)
minimizing the sum of squared residuals ψ2 given the moment conditions in Equations
(1.55), (1.56), and (1.57):(
ρh ρs µs ξ1 ξ2 σ
µ,2
t σ
2
τ σ
,2
t
)
, (1.58)
for t = {1939, ..., 1969, . . . , 2009}.
We can track the history of the variance of persistent income shocks, σ,2t , back to
the year when the oldest cohorts at the start of the survey in 1970 entered the labor
market. This way we obtain a time series for income uncertainty going back to 1939,
see Figure 1.11.
Table 1.5 summarizes the parameters values of interest. Persistent shocks to id-
iosyncratic income have an annual autocorrelation of ρh = 0.9069 and an average stan-
dard deviation of σ¯ = sqrt(exp(µs + var(σ
,2
t )
2(1−ρ2s) ) = 0.1483 – similar to the estimates by
Storesletten et al. (2004). For shocks to the variance of persistent income shocks, we
estimate an annual autocorrelation of ρs = 0.6651 and a coefficient of variation of
σs√
1−ρ2s
= sqrt(exp(var(σ
,2
t )
(1−ρ2s) )− 1) = 0.607.
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Table 1.5: Parameter estimates
ρh ρs σ¯
σs√
1−ρ2s
0.9069 0.6651 0.1483 0.6070
Notes: Where σ¯ in Equation 1.6 corresponds to the (level-)mean
of the persistent component, sqrt(exp(µs + var(σ
,2
t )
(1−ρ2s) ), and the risk-shifting parameter s follows from the coefficient of variation implied
by the variation in the persistent component, sqrt(exp(var(σ
,2
t )
(1−ρ2s) )− 1).These annual estimates are then converted to quarterly frequency.
Figure 1.11: Idiosyncratic income uncertainty 1939-2009
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Notes: Constructed time series for the variance of persistent idiosyncratic income shocks based
on PSID data. The second panel is without the linear-quadratic trend.
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C. Asset Distribution
Table 1.6 summarizes the wealth distribution implied by our model (i.e., for the baseline
calibration without fluctuations in uncertainty). As with any incomplete markets model
that does not resort to heterogeneity in preferences or extremely skewed processes for
idiosyncratic productivity, we fail to match the skewness in wealth documented for the
U.S. Whereas the fraction of wealth held by the richest quintile is about 80% in the U.S.,
the top quintile in our model holds only 41% of total wealth. The same discrepancy
holds for the Gini coefficient, where our model falls short as well – 0.38 versus 0.8 in
the data.
Table 1.6: Asset distribution
Quintiles Gini-Coeff.
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Fraction of total wealth 3.62 10.93 17.98 26.16 41.31 0.38
...share held in money 31.99 18.54 12.56 8.32 5.54
...share held in capital 68.01 81.46 87.44 91.68 94.46
Fraction without money 0.87 1.00 1.61 2.42 2.65
Fraction without capital 4.30 0.12 0.02 0.00 0.00
These shortcomings are, however, not of great importance for our transmission mech-
anism. The top quintile is well insured, because they hold a sizable amount of liquid
assets. Hence, they are least affected by ups and downs in uncertainty. The lower
quintiles are the ones building up precautionary savings and thus the ones that react
strongest to changes in uncertainty. In this dimension our model replicates the data
fairly well. The poorest quintile in the U.S. has about zero wealth on average – includ-
ing indebted households. The poorest households in our model hold only few assets –
3.6% of total wealth.
Our model also has implications for the ratio of liquid to illiquid assets conditional on
how rich households are in total. Households save in money because it provides better
short-term consumption smoothing than capital. This value of liquidity decreases in
the amount of money a household holds. Hence, our model implies that the share of
liquid assets in the portfolio declines in total wealth. Figure 1.12 plots the prediction
of our model and the data equivalent taken from the Survey of Consumer Finances
2004 (SCF) according to the definitions by Kaplan and Violante (2014). The poorest
households in the U.S. and in our model predominantly hold liquid assets. The share
of liquid assets then rapidly falls below 20% in both graphs, but rises again in the SCF
for the richest households. This is because stocks, mutual funds, and non-governmental
bond holdings are concentrated at the top quintiles as can be seen by comparing the
broad liquidity measure, which includes all of those, to the narrow definition. If we
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Figure 1.12: Share of liquid assets in total net worth against percentiles of total wealth
in 2004
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Notes: We compare our measure of liquid net worth (see Figure 1.1) to a
broader definition of liquid assets that includes mutual funds, stocks, and
non-governmental bonds as in Kaplan and Violante (2014). For graphical
illustration we make use of an Epanechnikov Kernel-weighted local linear
smoother with bandwidth 0.15.
also exclude those assets that usually induce some transaction cost (e.g., a commission)
when acquiring them from a bank or broker, the share of liquid assets is substantially
reduced for the asset rich.
D. Quality of the Numerical Solution
The equilibrium forecasting rules are obtained by regressing them in each iteration
of the algorithm on 10.000 observations. We generate the observations by simulating
the model in parallel on 20 machines, letting each economy run for 750 periods and
discarding the first 250 periods. The R2 is generally above 99% for all calibrations; see
Tables 1.9 and 1.10. In the case of perfect stabilization, pit is virtually constant, such
that the R2 of the pi-forecasting is a nonsensical statistic. Figure 1.13 shows that our
results are robust to increasing the resolution for the aggregate state variables.
Following Den Haan (2010), we also test the out-of-sample performance of the fore-
casting rules. For this we initialize the model and the forecasting rules at steady state
values, feed in the same shock sequence, but otherwise let them run independently.
Figure 1.14 plots time series of the prices q and pi as well as the states K and M taken
from the simulation of the model and the forecasting rules. The equilibrium forecasting
rules track the evolution of the underlying model without any tendency of divergence.
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Table 1.7 summarizes the mean and maximum difference between the series generated
by the model and the forecasting rules. The mean error for all four time series is less
than 0.3%. The maximum errors are small, too.
Table 1.7: Forecasting errors
Price of capital qt Capital Kt Inflation pit Real money Mt
Mean Error 0.28 0.07 0.01 0.22
Max Error 1.20 0.20 0.07 0.69
Notes: Percentage differences in out-of-sample forecasts between forecasting rules
and model for t = {1, ..., 1.500}; see Den Haan (2010).
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Figure 1.13: Uncertainty shock with higher resolution in K and M
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Figure 1.14: Out-of-sample performance of the forecasting rules
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Notes: Out-of-sample comparison between law of motions and model zoomed in at t = {1000, ..., 1.500} for visibility; see
Den Haan (2010).
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E. Welfare
Table 1.8 provides the long run welfare effects with and without stabilization after 75
years when the economy is back at its steady state.
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Table 1.8: Welfare after 75 years
Policy regime: Constant money growth
Quintiles of money holdings Quintiles of capital holdings
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Conditional -0.20 -0.18 -0.15 -0.11 -0.05 -0.11 -0.10 -0.12 -0.14 -0.18
Median -0.23 -0.18 -0.13 -0.08 0.02 -0.14 -0.13 -0.14 -0.16 -0.18
Quintiles of Human Capital
Conditional -0.09 -0.13 -0.14 -0.14 -0.16
Median -0.06 -0.11 -0.15 -0.16 -0.23
Policy regime: Inflation stabilization
Quintiles of money holdings Quintiles of capital holdings
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Conditional -0.03 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07
Median -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.00 -0.07 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03
Quintiles of human capital
Conditional 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.08 -0.14
Median 0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.08 -0.17
Policy regime: Fed reaction function
Quintiles of money holdings Quintiles of capital holdings
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Conditional -0.11 -0.11 -0.10 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.10 -0.11
Median -0.14 -0.11 -0.08 -0.05 0.00 -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.10
Quintiles of human capital
Conditional -0.04 -0.07 -0.09 -0.10 -0.15
Median -0.01 -0.06 -0.09 -0.12 -0.20
Notes: Welfare costs in terms of consumption equivalents (CE) as defined in (1.20).
Conditional refers to integrating out the missing dimensions, whereas Median refers to
median asset holdings of the respective other assets. We track households over 300
quarters and average over 100 independent model simulations.
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F. Robustness Checks
For the risk aversion parameter, the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, the average
markup, and the frequency of price adjustment, we take standard values from the
literature as there is no direct counterpart in the data. To account for this loose cali-
bration strategy, we check the robustness of our findings with respect to the assumed
parameter values. We do so by varying one of the parameters at a time while recali-
brating the discount factor and the participation frequency of households to match the
targeted capital and money to output ratios and the capital adjustment costs to match
a relative investment volatility of 3.18
We find our results to be robust to all the considered parameter variations. The
impulse response functions for output, consumption, investment, and inflation are dis-
played in Figure 1.15. The output drop on impact always remains around 0.5% – the
result of our baseline calibration. Key for this robustness is the recalibration of other
parameters. For example, if households are assumed to be less risk averse, then capital
must be less liquid to match the observed holdings of liquid assets. Therefore, while
a lower risk aversion makes the increase in precautionary savings less pronounced, the
inferred lower liquidity of capital intensifies the liquidity effect. This leaves the output
effect almost unchanged. In other words, the stability of our results stems from the
model inherent trade-offs.
18For the robustness check where we set the inverse Frisch elasticity to 1, physical capital becomes so
attractive to households, that the calibration forces capital to become very illiquid in order to match
the observed money to output ratio. Then, however, investment moves so little (as close to nobody
can trade) that there is no positive adjustment cost such that the relative investment volatility is 3.
In these cases we assume no capital adjustment costs.
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Figure 1.15: Uncertainty shock – Robustness
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G. Equilibrium Forecasting Rules
Tables 1.9 to 1.11 display the equilibrium laws of motion for the Krusell-Smith equilib-
rium.
Table 1.9: Laws of motion for the price of capital
Baseline ξ κ µ γ
θ2 = 0 θ2 = 103 θ2 = .35 3* 5 0.04 0.5 5* 15 1*
θ3 = 0 θ3 = 0 θ3 = .9
β1q
s1 1.71 1.39 1.75 0.79 2.03 3.46 -0.44 0.15 2.36 5.18
s2 1.71 1.41 1.75 0.87 2.01 3.30 -0.36 0.67 2.34 5.70
s3 1.70 1.50 1.77 0.89 1.99 3.19 -0.39 0.53 2.33 5.85
s4 1.69 1.55 1.78 0.90 2.00 3.10 -0.37 0.35 2.33 5.96
s5 1.70 1.62 1.79 0.91 2.03 3.09 -0.35 0.22 2.34 6.04
s6 1.72 1.66 1.80 0.93 2.05 3.03 -0.39 0.33 2.35 6.29
s7 1.82 1.75 1.82 1.00 2.14 3.06 -0.25 0.51 2.40 6.58
β2q
s1 0.50 0.12 0.22 0.14 0.63 0.65 0.46 0.08 0.74 1.02
s2 0.52 0.13 0.24 0.16 0.65 0.68 0.47 0.10 0.75 1.17
s3 0.53 0.14 0.26 0.17 0.66 0.69 0.48 0.12 0.77 1.30
s4 0.54 0.15 0.27 0.19 0.68 0.69 0.50 0.13 0.78 1.45
s5 0.55 0.16 0.29 0.22 0.69 0.69 0.51 0.15 0.78 1.60
s6 0.58 0.18 0.31 0.24 0.71 0.69 0.54 0.17 0.78 1.80
s7 0.61 0.20 0.34 0.29 0.74 0.73 0.57 0.20 0.79 2.04
β3q
s1 -0.86 -0.83 -1.03 -0.45 -1.00 -1.97 0.55 -0.04 -1.22 -2.87
s2 -0.86 -0.85 -1.03 -0.49 -0.99 -1.86 0.49 -0.36 -1.21 -3.18
s3 -0.87 -0.90 -1.04 -0.51 -0.99 -1.79 0.49 -0.26 -1.21 -3.25
s4 -0.87 -0.94 -1.05 -0.51 -1.00 -1.74 0.48 -0.15 -1.22 -3.29
s5 -0.88 -0.99 -1.06 -0.50 -1.03 -1.74 0.46 -0.07 -1.23 -3.30
s6 -0.90 -1.02 -1.07 -0.51 -1.05 -1.72 0.48 -0.13 -1.25 -3.42
s7 -0.98 -1.08 -1.10 -0.55 -1.13 -1.74 0.38 -0.23 -1.31 -3.56
R2
99.55 98.54 99.70 98.52 99.74 99.58 99.40 98.77 99.57 99.00
* For readability the coefficients of the law of motion are mutiplied by 10.000.
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Table 1.10: Laws of motion for inflation
Baseline ξ κ µ γ
θ2 = 0 θ2 = 103 θ2 = .35 3 5 0.04 0.5 5 15 1
θ3 = 0 θ3 = 0 θ3 = .9
β1pi
s1 2.80 0.48 0.08 12.46 2.65 44.20 -19.49 40.74 3.76 6.07
s2 2.37 0.49 0.50 13.19 2.40 43.59 -19.30 33.41 3.54 6.34
s3 2.16 0.49 1.20 14.36 2.44 44.14 -19.31 27.85 3.56 6.57
s4 1.67 0.49 1.49 14.33 2.17 41.17 -19.21 21.63 3.26 6.55
s5 1.19 0.49 1.82 14.08 1.86 37.87 -19.55 18.86 2.87 6.63
s6 1.00 0.49 2.20 13.99 1.41 34.76 -19.92 2.06 2.54 6.56
s7 0.59 0.49 2.18 13.54 0.77 28.95 -20.62 -39.60 2.29 6.28
β2pi
s1 4.19 -0.00 0.53 4.18 3.87 10.06 2.83 3.36 4.03 2.79
s2 4.31 0.00 0.71 4.64 3.97 11.44 2.85 3.87 4.12 3.09
s3 4.39 0.00 0.87 5.04 4.06 11.97 2.89 4.30 4.23 3.37
s4 4.47 0.00 1.02 5.42 4.14 12.07 2.96 4.69 4.28 3.65
s5 4.57 0.00 1.19 5.85 4.26 12.19 3.06 5.13 4.36 3.98
s6 4.76 0.00 1.38 6.39 4.42 12.34 3.21 5.64 4.49 4.39
s7 5.17 0.00 1.67 7.27 4.80 13.19 3.49 6.44 4.88 5.03
β3pi
s1 1.17 0.01 0.78 -5.25 1.14 -22.92 14.99 -22.73 0.71 -1.78
s2 1.27 0.01 0.49 -5.76 1.11 -22.25 14.73 -18.23 0.74 -2.01
s3 1.22 0.01 0.00 -6.58 0.92 -22.81 14.62 -14.83 0.61 -2.22
s4 1.36 0.01 -0.22 -6.59 0.92 -21.24 14.46 -11.04 0.68 -2.26
s5 1.48 0.01 -0.47 -6.46 0.95 -19.50 14.60 -9.37 0.81 -2.34
s6 1.40 0.01 -0.78 -6.43 1.05 -18.03 14.75 0.91 0.88 -2.34
s7 1.48 0.01 -0.83 -6.08 1.29 -14.71 15.13 26.52 0.97 -2.13
R2
99.87 88.77 99.66 99.89 99.84 99.08 99.81 99.89 99.73 99.87
Notes: For readability all values are mutiplied by 100.
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Table 1.11: Laws of mo-
tion for Fed policy rule
continued
Baseline
θ2 = .35 θ2 = .35
θ3 = .9 θ3 = .9
β4q β
4
pi
s1 5.65 19.43
s2 25.18 20.84
s3 33.51 20.71
s4 36.83 20.32
s5 47.80 19.39
s6 70.02 18.78
s7 116.69 19.15
Notes: For readability all
values are mutiplied by
100.
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Chapter 2
Fiscal Stimulus Payments and
Precautionary Investment
Deficit-financed government transfers to households have been an impor-
tant part of the fiscal response to the last two recessions in the United
States. This paper assesses the aggregate effects of this type of fiscal inter-
vention in a New Keynesian business cycle model with incomplete markets
and portfolio choice between liquid public debt and illiquid physical assets.
In this environment, transfers do not only work through the disposable in-
come channel but also by affecting household liquidity. Transfers increase
individual liquidity and debt finance enhances market liquidity. This has
consequences when the government retires this debt. Then households shift
their savings into the physical asset to smooth consumption. This leads to
a prolonged increase in capital and output. This precautionary investment
channel dominates negative wealth effects of distortionary taxes, making
aggregate effects expansionary independent of the mode of financing.
1. Introduction
Deficit-financed government transfers to households, so called fiscal stimulus payments,
have become part and parcel of the fiscal response to recessions. In the last two reces-
sion of 2001 and 2007-2009, U.S. households received one-off payments between $500
to $1000 amounting to fiscal outlays of 0.4 − 0.7% of annual GDP. Household-level
data from both episodes reveal that households spent on average around 25% of those
payments on consumption.1 The average size and the distribution of the consumption
response can be rationalized through liquidity constraints (see Kaplan and Violante,
2014). Whether this type of fiscal intervention is successful in stabilizing output, how-
ever, depends on the joint-response of consumption and investment. A key argument
against government transfers is that government deficits may crowd out private invest-
1See e.g. Johnson et al. (2006) and Parker et al. (2013). These studies have exploited the fact that
the timing of receipt of payment was based on the last two digits of individual Social Security Numbers
and, thus, effectively random. This randomization allows to estimate the causal effect of receipt of
payment on consumption relative to the control group of households that received the payment in a
different quarter.
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ment potentially offsetting any increase in consumption.
This paper accounts for both household consumption and portfolio decisions in
assessing the aggregate effects of fiscal stimulus payments. Toward this end, we build
a New Keynesian business cycle model with incomplete markets and portfolio choice
between liquid public debt and illiquid physical assets. Public debt can be traded
without frictions, whereas physical capital can only be adjusted with a fixed probability
each period. As in Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998), households value public debt as an
additional means of smoothing consumption.
Despite of public debt and capital being substitutes, we find that deficit-financed
government transfers may actually lead to a crowding-in of investment. Key for this
result is the transient nature of the increase in public debt. On impact, when fiscal
transfers and the increase in public debt take place, public debt only partly replaces
capital while total savings increase. When - foreseeable - the government starts to retire
this debt, households would like to hang on to their improved consumption-smoothing
capacity. This crowds in private investment. We find that a faster reversal in public
debt leads to a stronger boom in investment.
What is more, this precautionary investment channel is little affected by how public
debt is financed. This is in stark contrast to an economy without the liquidity effect of
public debt, in which financing by tax hikes or spending cuts lead to opposite investment
responses. When transfers are financed by distortionary taxes, the net wealth effect of
transfers is negative and, thus, savings fall in an economy with complete markets. When
financed by government spending cuts, transfers imply an increase in wealth and, thus,
a positive investment response. When markets are incomplete, however, the liquidity
effect dominates the wealth effect such that investment always increases independent
of the financing.
With these results, this paper contributes to the literature on the aggregate effects
of fiscal stimulus payments by highlighting the liquidity channel of public debt. Oh and
Reis (2012) build a model with incomplete markets and sticky prices, but abstract from
public debt and instead look into the effects of redistribution across households within
a period. Other studies feature Ricardian households to simplify the role of public debt.
Giambattista and Pennings (2013) compare the multiplier of government purchases and
transfer in a model with Ricardian and rule-of-thumb households. In a similar vein,
Mehrotra (2014) compares both multipliers in a borrower-lender economy. McKay and
Reis (2016) assess automatic fiscal stabilizers in a model in which Ricardian households
own the capital stock.
We also contribute to the literature that discusses the effects of public debt by rais-
ing the supply of assets. We share with Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) the focus on
precautionary motives, but go beyond their steady state analysis. We show that tran-
sitory increases in public debt do not crowd-out capital because of an investment boom
during the transition back to steady state. In a model without precautionary motives,
Woodford (1990) shows that higher public debt may crowd-in investment through loos-
ening liquidity constraints. The spirit of the analysis is closest to Challe and Ragot
(2011). They investigate a similar liquidity channel in the case of deficit-financed gov-
ernment spending shocks with a focus on the consumption response. They find as well
that liquidity effects dominate wealth effects leading to a crowding-in of consumption.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2, 3, and 4 explain the
model, solution method, and calibration. Section 5 presents the quantitative results,
and Section 6 concludes.
2. Model
The model economy builds on Bayer et al. (2015) and, thus, we only describe in the
following the changes made to the model framework presented in the previous chapter.
The economic environment differs as we consider an unexpected transfer payment of
0.5% of annual GDP, and explicitly model besides a monetary authority a government
sector collecting taxes and following strict fiscal rules. Fiscal policy is described either
by a tax or a spending rule reacting to public debt deviations from steady state. Fur-
thermore, the central bank conducts monetary policy in a conventional way and sets
the nominal interest rate according to a Taylor (1993)-type rule. In contrast to Chap-
ter 1, a worker-household can now either stay a worker in the next period or transit
into entrepreneurship with some exogenous probability, which is independent from its
productivity level. In this approach, we follow Luetticke (2015). We next describe the
modified household problem and the government sector in more detail. The problem of
firms is unchanged.
2.1 Households
The household problem is modified in various ways. There are two types of households,
entrepreneurs (sit = 0) and workers (sit = 0). They switch from one type to the other
according to an idiosyncratic shock sit.2 At all times, the fraction of entrepreneurial
households remains constant. Worker-households supply labor on a perfectly compet-
itive market and their idiosyncratic labor productivity, hit, follows an autoregressive
process of order one. Compared to Chapter 1, we abstract from persistent shocks to
productivity risk, which remains constant at σ¯:
log hit = ρh log hit−1 + it, it ∼ N (0, σ¯) . (2.1)
Entrepreneurial households do not participate in the labor market and instead hold
an equal stake in the economy’s total profits Πt, generated by monopolistic resellers.
Both, entrepreneur- and worker-households, pay proportional taxes, τt, either on their
earned profits, Πt, or on their labor income, wthitNt. Depending on the fiscal rule in
place, the government might adjusts taxes in response to changes in government debt.
In particular, households now receive an unexpected lump-sum transfer, τ0 in period
t = 0 from the government.
For those households participating in the capital market, the modified budget con-
2Please note that sit now denotes an idiosyncratic shock to the employment status of household i
and no longer refers to the aggregate uncertainty shock.
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straint reads:3
cit + bit+1 + qtkit+1 =
RBt−1
pit
bit + (qt + rt)kit + τt [sitwthitNt + (1− sit)Πt] + τ0,
kit+1 ≥ 0, bit+1 ≥ 0, (2.2)
where bit is the real value of nominal bond holdings, kit are capital holdings, qt is the
price of capital, rt is the rental rate or “dividend”, RBt−1 is the gross nominal return on
bonds, and pit = PtPt−1 is the inflation rate. We denote real bond holdings of household
i at the end of period t by bit+1 := b˜it+1Pt .
For those households that cannot trade in the market for capital, the modified
budget constraint simplifies to:
cit + bit+1 =
RBt−1
pit
bit + rtkit + τt [sitwthitNt + (1− sit)Πt] + τ0,
bit+1 ≥ 0. (2.3)
With this setup, two Bellman equations characterize the dynamic planning prob-
lem of a household; Va in case the household can adjust its capital holdings and Vn
otherwise:4
Va(b, k, h, s; Θ) = max
k′,b′a
u[c(b, b′a, k, k′, h, s)] + β[νEV a(b′a, k′, h′, s′,Θ′)
+ (1− ν)EV n(b′a, k′, h′, s′,Θ′)],
Vn(b, k, h, s; Θ) = max
b′n
u[c(b, b′n, k, h, s)] + β[νEV a(b′n, k, h′, s′,Θ′)
+ (1− ν)EV n(b′n, k, h′, s′,Θ′)]. (2.4)
2.2 Central Bank and Government
Following the modifications made by Luetticke (2015) to our model framework in Chap-
ter 1, the central bank sets the nominal interest rate RBt on government bonds according
to a Taylor rule that reacts to inflation more than one-to-one (θpi > 1), whenever infla-
tion exceeds its target value, pi:
RBt
RB
=
(
RBt−1
RB
)ρ
RB (1 + pit
1 + pi
)θpi
. (2.5)
The parameter ρRB captures the policy inertia of the nominal interest rate, empirically
documented by Clarida et al. (2000).
The fiscal authority pays lump-sum transfers τ0 > 0 to households in period t = 0
that are financed by debt issuance. In all other periods, τ0 equals zero. Let Bt+1 denote
3The household problem can be expressed in terms of composite good xit by making use of cit =
xit + τtwthitNt1+γ .
4No conditioning on aggregate shocks is required. The transfer shock only occurs at t = 0 and then
the economy deterministically reverts back to steady state.
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time t real value of public debt. The government budget constraint reads:
Bt+1 =
RBt−1
1 + pit
Bt +Gt + τ0 − Tt, (2.6)
where real tax revenues are given by:
Tt = (1− τt)
[
(NtWt
∫
sihiΘt(b, k, h, s)) + Πt
]
. (2.7)
The government either adjusts taxes, τt, or government spending, Gt, to bring debt
back to its steady state value from t = 1 onwards. We assume simple linear rules similar
to the ones estimated by Leeper et al. (2010):
Gt = γ1 − γ2(Bt −B), (2.8)
τt = γ3 + γ4 log(Bt/B), (2.9)
with B equal to the steady state debt level. The parameters γ2, γ4 > 0 measure the
speed at which public debt returns to its steady state value.
2.3 Goods, Bonds, Capital, and Labor Market Clearing
The labor market clears at the competitive wage given in (1.8) in Chapter 1; so does
the market for capital services if (1.9) from Chapter 1 holds.
The nominal bonds market clears, whenever the following equation holds:
Bt+1 =
∫
[νb∗a(b, k, h, s; qt, pit) + (1− ν)b∗n(b, k, h, s; qt, pit)]
Θt(b, k, h, s)dbdkdhds, (2.10)
Last, the market for capital has to clear:
qt = 1 + φ
Kt+1 −Kt
Kt
= 1 + νφK
∗
t+1 −Kt
Kt
, (2.11)
K∗t+1 :=
∫
k∗(b, k, h, s; qt, pit)Θt(b, k, h, s)dbdkdhds,
Kt+1 = Kt + ν(K∗t+1 −Kt),
where the first equation stems from competition in the production of capital goods, the
second equation defines the aggregate supply of funds from households trading capital,
and the third equation defines the law of motion of aggregate capital. The goods market
then clears due to Walras’ law, whenever both, bonds and capital markets, clear.
2.4 Recursive Equilibrium
A recursive equilibrium in our model is a set of policy functions {x∗a, x∗n, b∗a, b∗n, k∗}, value
functions {Va, Vn}, pricing functions {r, RB, w, pi, q}, aggregate bonds, capital and labor
supply functions {B,N,K}, distributions Θt over individual asset holdings, types, and
productivity, and a perceived law of motion Γ, such that
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1. Given {Va, Vn}, Γ, prices, and distributions, the policy functions {x∗a, x∗n, b∗a, b∗n, k∗}
solve the households’ planning problem, and given the policy functions, prices and
distributions, the value functions {Va, Vn} are a solution to the Bellman equations
(1.7).
2. The labor, the final-goods, the bonds, the capital, and the intermediate-good
markets clear, i.e., (1.8), (1.13), (2.10), and (2.11) hold.
3. The actual law of motion and the perceived law of motion Γ coincide, i.e., Θ′ =
Γ(Θ, s′).
3. Numerical Implementation
We compute the transitional dynamics after an unexpected one-off fiscal stimulus shock
with the help of Krusell and Smith (1998a)-rules. We consider an economy that is in
steady state before period t = 0. In t = 0, all households receive an unexpected
fiscal transfer, τ0. There are no more shocks from t = 1 onwards. From then on,
households anticipate how prices evolve on the path back to the long-run equilibrium
of the economy. These prices are, of course, a function of all states including the joint
distribution Θt(b, k, h, s). Hence, we assume that households predict future prices on
the basis of a restricted set of moments as in Krusell and Smith (1997, 1998a).
Specifically, we make the assumption that households condition their expectations
on last period’s aggregate real bond holdings, Bt, last period’s nominal interest rate,
RBt−1, and the aggregate stock of capital, Kt. If asset-demand functions, b∗a,n and k∗,
are sufficiently close to linear in human capital, h, and in non-human wealth, b and k,
at the mass of Θt, we can expect approximate aggregation to hold. For this exercise,
the three aggregate states – Bt, RBt−1, Kt – are sufficient to describe the evolution of
the aggregate economy.
Households use the following log-linear forecasting rules for current inflation and
the price of capital:
log pit = β1pi + β2piBˆt + β3piKˆt + β4piRˆBt−1, (2.12)
log qt = β1q + β2q Bˆt + β3q Kˆt + β4q RˆBt−1, (2.13)
where (ˆ.) refers to log-differences from the steady state value of each variable. The
law of motion for aggregate real bonds, Bt, then follows from the government budget
constraint (2.6). The Taylor-rule (2.5) determines the motion of the nominal interest
rate, RBt . The law of motion for Kt results from (2.11).
To find the deterministic law of motion in response to a zero-probability fiscal
stimulus payment shock, we need to solve for the market clearing prices each period.
Concretely, this means the posited rules, (2.12) and (2.13), are used to solve for the
households’ policy functions. Having solved for the policy functions conditional on the
forecasting rules, we then simulate the model for t = 0, . . . , T periods, keeping track of
the actual distribution Θt. The simulation starts in steady state and the transfer shock
hits in t = 0. We then calculate in each period t the optimal policies for market clearing
inflation rates and asset prices assuming that households resort to the policy functions
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derived under rule (2.12) and (2.13) from period t+ 1 onwards. Having determined the
market clearing prices, we obtain next period’s distribution Θt+1. We next re-estimate
the parameters of (2.12) and (2.13) from the simulated data and update the parameters
accordingly. Subsequently, we recalculate policy functions and iterate until convergence
in the forecasting rules.
The posited rules (2.12) and (2.13) approximate the aggregate behavior of the econ-
omy well. The within sample R2 is well above 99% (see Appendix A).
4. Calibration
One period in the model is a quarter. We adopt most of the calibration of Chapter 1 for
the household and firm side, and in the following only elaborate on the differences in the
calibration strategy relative to the previous chapter. In particular, we now explicitly
target the share of poor and wealthy hand-to-mouth households as estimated in Kaplan
and Violante (2014).
4.1 Households
For the felicity function, u = 11−ξx
1−ξ, we set the coefficient of relative risk aversion
to ξ = 1.5. We jointly choose this parameter value with the standard deviation of
the income process to match the percent of poor and wealthy liquidity constrained
households, which jointly make up around 33% of the households in the Survey of
Consumer Finances (SCF) in 2004, and of which 2/3 are defined as wealthy. Households
are considered to be liquidity constrained, if their liquid assets are half of their monthly
income. In accordance with Kaplan and Violante (2014), a household is defined as
wealthy, if it owns positive amounts of illiquid wealth. We set the implied annual
persistence of income shocks to a common estimate of 0.95. As in Luetticke (2015),
we calibrate the share of entrepreneurs in the economy to be 1% in order to match the
U.S. net wealth Gini coefficient of 0.82 in the SCF.
The aggregate data used for the calibration of the capital-to-output ratio and the
bonds-to-output ratio in the model spans 1984Q1 to 2008Q3. This way, we now match
an annual debt-to-GDP ratio of 23%, which reflects the net asset of government bonds
available to households prior to the large expansion of public balance sheets in response
to the Financial Crisis. In particular, we consider average U.S. federal debt held by
domestic private agents. The parameter governing the adjustment costs of capital,
φ = 10, is chosen as in Luetticke (2015), where he targets a relative investment volatility
of 3.
4.2 Central Bank and Government
As in Chapter 1, the annual inflation rate is at 2%. The steady state nominal return
on government bonds is set to 4% p.a. We adopt the parameter, ρRB = 0.95 describing
the policy inertia inherent to the nominal interest rate from Nakamura and Steinsson
(2013) and set the central bank’s reaction parameter to inflation deviations from target
to θpi = 1.5, a common value in the New Keynesian literature.
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Table 2.1: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value Description Target
Households
β 0.985 Discount factor K/Y = 290% (annual)
ν 4.5% Participation frequency B/Y = 23% (annual)
ξ 1.5 Coefficient of rel. risk av. Share of liquidity
constrained households
γ 0.5 Inv. Frisch elasticity Standard value
Intermediate Goods
α 72% Share of labor Income share of labor of 66%
δ 1.35% Depreciation rate NIPA: Fixed assets & durables
Final Goods
κ 0.08 Price stickiness Avg. price duration of 4 quarters
µ 0.06 Markup 6% markup (standard value)
Capital Goods
φ 10 Capital adjustment costs STD(I)/STD(Y )=3
Fiscal Policy
γ1 0.05 G in steady state G/Y = 20%
γ2 0.2 G reaction function Path of debt
γ3 0.3 Tax rate in steady state Budget balance
γ4 0.2 τ reaction function Path of debt
Monetary Policy
Π 1.005 Inflation 2% p.a.
RB 1.01 Nominal interest rate 4% p.a.
θpi 1.5 Reaction to inflation Standard value
ρRB 0.95 Interest rate smoothing Nakamura and Steinsson (2013)
Income Process
ρh 0.987 Persistence of productivity Standard value
σ¯ 0.08 STD of innovations Share of poor liquidity
constrained households
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The proportional tax rate, 1 − τ = 0.3, levied on labor income and profits is cho-
sen such that in the stationary equilibrium total tax revenues cover total government
expenses on purchases and interest payments on government debt. Government pur-
chases amount to 20% of annual output. Fiscal policy is described either by a tax or
spending rule reacting to public debt deviations from steady state, in order to rule out
an explosive path of government debt. We pick the reaction parameters in the baseline
calibration such that government debt is back at its steady state debt level under both
rules after 40 quarters. Table 2.1 summarizes the calibration.
5. Results
In the following, we consider a policy experiment that consists of an unexpected, one-off
payment of about $500 (0.5% of annual output) to each household in the economy paid
out in t = 0. We assume that the policy is deficit financed in t = 0 and that from
t = 1 onwards either labor taxes or government spending react to debt deviations from
steady state according to a fiscal rule that brings debt back to its steady state value.
We first show that the model replicates the distribution of marginal propensities to
consume across households as documented by the empirical literature. We then assess
the aggregate effects of this type of fiscal intervention under both financing schemes
while keeping the path of debt constant. We do so in the full model in which public
debt affects household liquidity and in a representative agent version of the model to
highlight the importance of liquidity effects for aggregate outcomes.
5.1 Individual Consumption Response
Figure 2.1 plots the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) as a function of a house-
hold’s asset position. Throughout most of the asset-space households consume very
little out of the $500 payment by the government. This includes the diagonal along
which all households would be clustered if we were to consider net worth only. With
two assets, however, a large fraction of wealthy households prefers to hold high-return
illiquid over liquid assets (capital ki over bonds bi). This makes them potentially con-
strained in their consumption. In addition, these “wealthy hand-to-mouth” households
have a higher MPC than their poor counterparts without any assets. The MPC in-
creases in capital because richer households have a higher target for their consumption
path. For households very rich in capital but without any liquid assets it actually
reaches 90%, whereas households with no assets at all consume around 25% out of
extra cash.
These patterns are reminiscent of recent empirical findings on household consump-
tion behavior. Misra and Surico (2014), who use quantile regressions to identify het-
erogeneity in consumption responses, document that the households with the highest
MPCs hold little liquid assets. The model is able to replicate this finding because of
two features: First, markets are incomplete and households face idiosyncratic income
risk making them ex-post heterogeneous. Second, portfolio choice between liquid and
illiquid assets renders a large fraction of households constrained in their consumption
each period. Short-run fluctuations in marginal utility are less costly then foregoing
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the higher return on the illiquid asset.5
When it comes to the total effect of transfers, incomplete markets imply that it is
important to take into account the path of public debt. An increase in public debt en-
hances household liquidity by effectively loosening borrowing constraints (see Aiyagari
and McGrattan, 1998). When markets are incomplete, this has first order effects on
consumption and savings. In the following section, we discuss the role of public debt
for the aggregate effects of transfers.
Figure 2.1: Individual consumption response to a transfer shock
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Notes: Marginal propensities to consume in partial equilibrium with fixed prices. The bottom
of the graph depicts the distribution of households over capital and bond holdings relative to
annual income in steady state.
5.2 Aggregate Effects of Transfers Payments
This section assesses the aggregate effects of deficit-financed transfer payments in a
model in which public debt affects household liquidity. We compare two different fi-
nancing scenarios with opposing wealth effects while keeping the path of public debt
the same. We first discuss the effects of transfer payments with government spending
adjusting from t = 1 onwards. Under this scenario, the present-value wealth effect of
the fiscal intervention is positive.
Figure 2.2 shows the response of aggregate prices and quantities to the transfer
in the case of lower government spending in the future. The first row of Figure 2.2
depicts output and its components (consumption, investment, government spending)
as a percent of transfer. The solid line corresponds to the economy with endogenous
heterogeneity, whereas the dashed line shows the response of an economy with two types
5The idea that small deviations from optimal consumption imply negligible utility costs goes at
least back to Cochrane et al. (1989).
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of households: Ricardian households and hand-to-mouth households without access to
financial markets. We determine the share of hand-to-mouth households (about 30%)
in the two-agent model by matching the consumption response of the full model in the
first period.
Accordingly, consumption increases by 50% of the transfer in both economies. This
is about twice as much as the partial equilibrium response of consumption discussed in
the previous section. With sticky prices the initial increase in consumption is met by
higher production and, thus, higher income amplifying the direct effect of the trans-
fer on consumption. This disposable income channel, which relies on the presence of
households with high marginal propensities to consume, drives the output response in
the first period.
After the first period, the response of unconstrained households becomes central for
the path of output. Unconstrained households respond to the positive wealth effect by
increasing consumption permanently. To do so, households move wealth into the future.
In particular, they increase their holdings of physical assets as the government reduces
the amount of outstanding debt at the same time. This investment boom is stronger
with complete markets. Under incomplete markets, household portfolio choices are
influenced by precautionary motives, and investment therefore responds less strongly
because the portfolio composition matters for consumption smoothing (see Luetticke
(2015) for a similar argument in the case of monetary policy shocks).
The role of precautionary motives in shaping the investment response becomes more
evident in the case of higher future taxes (see Figure 2.3). Under this scenario, the
present-value wealth effect of the fiscal intervention is negative because of higher dis-
tortionary taxes. In the economy with limited heterogeneity, Ricardian households
react to the negative wealth effect by lowering their consumption and savings. This
leads to a crowding out of investment given the expansion of public debt. In the econ-
omy with endogenous heterogeneity, however, households still save in physical capital
because of precautionary motives. Households would like to hang on to their improved
consumption-smoothing capacity that the government brought about by increasing the
aggregate supply of savings devices. As the government retires its debt, this crowds in
private investment. The precautionary motives are also reflected in a lower liquidity
premium.
This precautionary investment channel breaks the downward spiral of lower capital
and lower labor supply, which occurs under complete markets. As a result, the output
response is positive despite the negative wealth effect. Without precautionary savings,
by contrast, increasing labor taxes to finance transfers leads to a long lasting recession
by crowding out capital.
Key for the crowding in of capital is the transient nature of the increase in public
debt. As in Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998), a permanent increase in public debt would
displace capital while total savings increase. Figure 2.2 and 2.3 show that a similar
logic applies to deficit-financed transfers. Investment initially falls but by substantially
less than the increase in bond holdings so that total savings increase significantly.
In contrast to a permanent increase in public debt, however, investment immediately
recovers as households respond to the reversal in public debt by shifting savings from
bonds to capital. After 40 quarters public debt is back at its steady state value and the
69
Figure 2.2: Response to transfer shock (0.5% of annual output) under spending rule
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Notes: Impulse responses to a deficit-financed one-off transfer of 0.5% of annual
output with tax rule stabilizing debt. Solid line: the model with heterogeneous
households. Dashed line: same calibration with a representative household and rule-
of-thumb households. *LP = (qt+1 + rt+1)/qt −RBt /pit+1 **Xt =
∫
(cit − hit n
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Figure 2.3: Response to transfer shock (0.5% of annual output) under tax rule
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Notes: Impulse responses to a deficit-financed one-off transfer of 0.5% of annual
output with tax rule stabilizing debt. Solid line: the model with heterogeneous
households. Dashed line: same calibration with a representative household and rule-
of-thumb households. *LP = (qt+1 + rt+1)/qt −RBt /pit+1 **Xt =
∫
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Figure 2.4: Response to transfer shock (0.5% of annual output) for different paths of
public debt
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Notes: Impulse responses to a deficit-financed one-off transfer of 0.5% of annual output
for different parameterizations of the tax rule stabilizing debt. Solid line: Debt back at
steady state in 40 quarters. Uneven-dashed line: Debt back at steady state in 30 quarters.
Even-dashed line: Debt back at steady state in 20 quarters.
boom in investment comes to an end.
Figure 2.4 compares the output, consumption, and investment response for different
paths of public debt. We find that the investment boom is more pronounced for a
faster reversal in debt as implied by the precautionary investment motive. Households
rely on their savings to smooth consumption in the presence of idiosyncratic income
shocks. Hence, households react to a faster reversal in public debt by faster accumulat-
ing physical assets. In the case of a return to the steady state debt level in 20 quarters,
investment does not fall in the first period and the output response is 40% larger than
in the baseline.
6. Conclusion
Deficit-financed fiscal stimulus payments have become an important policy measure to
counteract recessions. In this paper, we ask whether the empirical evidence on a siz-
able consumption response to such transfers at the household level implies that this
type of fiscal intervention is indeed expansionary? We do so by building a New Key-
nesian business cycle model with heterogeneous households that takes into account the
financing of transfers and matches the empirical evidence on the individual consump-
tion response. Importantly, in this environment, transfers not only affect the aggregate
economy through the disposable income channel but also by enhancing household and
market liquidity because of debt finance.
To highlight the importance of this liquidity channel for the aggregate economy, we
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contrast our model results to a two-agent model with Ricardian and hand-to-mouth
households, which replicates the consumption response to transfers but lacks the liq-
uidity effect of public debt. In the two-agent model, Ricardian households would like to
reduce their consumption and savings in response to the negative wealth effect of higher
future distortionary taxes, inducing a persistent decline in investment and a prolonged
recession. In contrast, in the presence of potentially binding borrowing constraints, a
precautionary investment motive overturns this result as households would like to hang
on to their improved consumption smoothing capacity and, thus, shift their savings into
the physical asset when the government starts to retire its debt.
We find that this liquidity channel is stronger than wealth effects induced by gov-
ernment fincancing decisions and, thus, makes the aggregate effects of transfers expan-
sionary independent of the mode of financing.
Appendices
A. Equilibrium Forecasting Rules
Tables 2.2 displays the equilibrium laws of motion for the Krusell-Smith equilibrium.
Table 2.2: Laws of motion
β1 β2 β3 β4 R2
Spending Rule
βpi 0.50 -1.23 2.10 -23.69 99.73
βq 0.01 5.05 -43.21 -38.59 99.95
Tax Rule
βpi 0.50 -0.70 0.27 -24.09 99.76
βq 0.00 3.77 -28.61 -41.56 99.95
All values are multiplied by 100 for read-
ability.
The equilibrium forecasting rules are obtained by regressing them in each iteration
of the algorithm on the response of the economy to the transfer shock. The R2 is above
99%.
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Chapter 3
Public Insurance and Wealth Inequality:
A Euro Area Analysis
This paper assesses the quantitative importance of cross-country differences
in labor market dynamics and social security institutions for euro area dif-
ferences in private net wealth inequality. I document the empirical puzzle
that euro area countries with the largest reduction in the income Gini coeffi-
cient through public transfers robustly show higher inequality in private net
wealth. Revisiting the argument by Hubbard et al. (1995) that public insur-
ance crowds out private savings especially of the poor, I construct a life-cycle
model with heterogeneous households and incomplete markets that features
exogenous labor market risks, unemployment benefits, mean-tested mini-
mum income support and public and occupational pensions. Calibrating
the model to the euro area differences in the net earnings process, unem-
ployment dynamics and social security system, it can account for 70.1%
of the cross-country differences in the net wealth Gini coefficients for the
bottom 95% of the wealth distribution. Welfare policies contribute 57.5%
to the wealth inequality differences across the euro area, while net earnings
and unemployment dynamics account for 12.6%.
1. Introduction
The first wave of the Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS)1, mainly
conducted in the period from 2009 to 2011, reveals that there are large cross-country
variations in household private net wealth inequality for the ten largest economies in the
euro area. The Gini coefficient of household net wealth ranges from 0.76 for Austria to
0.56 in Greece. Since the release of the HFCS in 2013, the causes of the large euro area
differences in private net wealth inequality and the surprisingly low median wealth in
some euro area countries with high GDP per capita have been at the forefront of public
and political debates. In particular, there has been a discussion about the role played
by institutional factors. This paper aims to contribute to this debate by assessing the
1This paper uses data from the HFCS and EU-SILC. The results published and the related obser-
vations and conclusions are mine and do not correspond to results or analysis of the HFCN, Eurostat,
the European Commission or any other national statistical authorities.
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quantitative importance of cross-country differences in social security institutions and
labor market dynamics for euro area differences in private net wealth inequality, as
measured by the Gini coefficient.
The interest in social security as a potential determinant of the wealth distribution
is motivated by the surprising finding that those countries with a larger reduction in
the income Gini coefficient through redistributive public transfers to households ro-
bustly show higher inequality in private net wealth. On its own, this correlation falls
short of providing a quantitative assessment of the importance of these policies. There-
fore, going back to the theoretical contribution by Hubbard et al. (1995) that public
insurance crowds out private savings, especially of the poor, I construct a life cycle
model with heterogeneous households and incomplete markets that features exogenous
labor market risks, unemployment insurance, means-tested minimum income support,
and pension benefits. There are three key determinants for wealth accumulation in
the model, namely old-age provision, leaving bequests, and precautionary savings to
self-insure against gross earnings, unemployment and life-span risk. The more redis-
tributive transfers are across households, the more pronounced the crowding-out effect
is on private precautionary savings for low-income households, as there is a relatively
greater reduction in their need for self-insurance.
Calibrating the model to the euro area differences in net earnings processes and
unemployment dynamics and to the institutional differences in public insurance, the
model can account for 70.1% of the euro area variation in private net wealth inequality.
Moreover, by adopting a modified method based on Guvenen et al. (2014), I provide a
decomposition that disentangles how much each factor contributes individually to this
fraction. The model results suggest that welfare policies contribute 57.5% to euro area
differences in net wealth Gini coefficients for the bottom 95% of the wealth distribu-
tion. It turns out that the most important institution of the social security system
for determining wealth inequality differences across the euro area is means-tested min-
imum income support. It contributes the lion’s share of 44.8%, followed by public and
occupational pension schemes, which account for 10.7%. Differences in unemployment
benefits, by contrast, play only a minor role, contributing 2%. Furthermore, the net
earnings processs and unemployment dynamics can jointly rationalize 12.6% of the euro
area differences in private net wealth inequality. This important role of public insur-
ance for wealth inequality patterns in the euro area also sheds light on why welfare
states with more redistributive transfers show higher wealth inequality. While transfers
directly mitigate income differences across households, their general availability leads
to a more unequal wealth distribution in the long run.
The importance of minimum income support programs for the wealth distribution
relative to other policies is rooted in several distinct features. First, minimum income
benefits are not dependent on past contributions and hence are more redistributive
across individuals compared to unemployment benefits or pensions, which are instead
more redistributive over the life cycle in the euro area. The lower bound on consumption
leaves households with high expected life-time income relatively unaffected in their
precautionary savings decision, while the need for self-insurance of households in the
lower part of the income distribution is substantially reduced, thereby increasing wealth
inequality. Second, minimum income assistance guarantees a certain lump sum transfer,
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while future potential unemployment benefits replace a constant fraction of previous
net income and are hence still dependent on uncertain net income. Similarly, there
remains some uncertainty about the exact pension level during retirement, as it will
depend on the household’s pre-retirement labor market performance. As households are
risk averse, the effects of unemployment and pension benefits on wealth inequality turn
out weaker despite strong crowding out effects on aggregate private savings. Third, the
asset-based means-testing of minimum income support introduces an implicit tax on
savings, such that low-wealth households face a trade-off between saving for bad income
states and dissaving to become eligible for income support. And last, minimum income
benefits are of unlimited duration, while unemployment benefits mitigate earnings losses
only temporarily.
Regarding the calibration of the model, I assume that all countries share the same
key technological and preference parameter values and allow them to differ only in
the parameters describing the unemployment and net earnings process, as well as the
social security system. The coefficient of determination then provides a measure to
quantify what fraction of cross-country differences in wealth inequality are generated
solely by these country-specific features of the labor market process and social security
institutions. For the decomposition exercise, I construct a fictive euro area country as a
reference unit, whose parameters correspond to the average of the individual countries’
parameters. I then sequentially set the country-specific parameters to the parameters
of the constructed reference euro area country until no parameter differences between
countries remain, and each time determine the explanatory power of the model. This
way, I can quantify how much each factor contributes individually to the overall fraction
of cross-country differences explained by the model. The variances of the gross earnings
processes are estimated from household income data of the European Survey on Income
and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) for 2004 until 2010. The calibration of labor income
tax schedules and welfare policies is mainly based on estimates from the OECD benefit
and tax model, or own estimates from the EU-SILC.
While several studies have highlighted the distortionary effects of certain institu-
tions of the social security system on aggregate savings, less research has concentrated
on the consequences of public insurance for private net wealth inequality. This is be-
cause research on wealth inequality has so far mainly focused on the upper tail of
the wealth distribution. In contrast, this paper sheds light on the remaining part of
the wealth distribution. It is shown that, when considering the bottom 95% of the
wealth distribution, large euro area differences in wealth inequality remain, and that
public transfers and labor market dynamics are indeed central for determining wealth
inequality patterns across the euro area.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the current literature, and
section 3 presents empirical evidence. Section 4 introduces the model, section 5 the
calibration strategy, and section 6 presents the quantitative results. Section 7 concludes.
2. Related Literature
There is a large theoretical literature on the determinants of wealth inequality, with
a particular focus on the high wealth concentration in the United States. In fact, the
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vast majority of the work has focused on the upper tail of the wealth distribution and,
in particular, on explaining high savings rates of wealthy people documented in the
empirical literature (Dynan et al., 2000). To account for these, standard incomplete
markets models have been extended by various features such as heterogeneity in patience
(Krusell and Smith, 1998b), transmission in human capital and voluntary bequests
across generations (De Nardi, 2004), entrepreneurship (Quadrini et al., 1999), high
returns on capital in the presence of borrowing constraints (Cagetti and De Nardi,
2006) or high earnings risk for top earners (Castaneda et al., 2003).
In contrast, less research has concentrated on the remaining part of the wealth dis-
tribution and, in particular, on the low savings of income poor households. In a seminal
paper, Hubbard et al. (1995) highlight the distortionary effects of social insurance on
households savings behavior through the reduction of income risk and an implicit tax
on savings in the presence of asset means-testing. In particular, they aim to explain
why many low-income households accumulate only little wealth over the life cycle, much
less than a standard life cycle model would suggest. Other work relates precautionary
savings to other institutions of social security systems, such as health insurance (Kot-
likoff, 1986), public pension systems or unemployment insurance. Engen and Gruber
(2001) show theoretically and empirically that higher unemployment replacement rates
crowd out aggregate savings. For the empirical analysis, they exploit differences in
unemployment generosity across U.S. states.
While most of those papers shed light on the distortion of aggregate savings through
specific institutions of the social security system, I jointly model three of them and
analyze their implications for wealth inequality. In a similar vein, two papers explicitly
relate wealth inequality to public insurance and more concretely public pension systems
for specific countries. Domeij and Klein (2002) show that wealth inequality in Sweden
is driven to a large extent by its very redistributive public pension scheme. Given
the current discussion about wealth inequality fueled by Thomas Piketty, Kaymak and
Poschke (2016) made a recent contribution, analyzing the extent to which institutional
changes from 1960 to 2010 in the U.S. can explain the increased share of wealth held
by the top percentiles. They find that despite the dominant role of changing wage
inequality, the expansion of social security in terms of more generous pensions and
Medicare can account for an important portion. Hintermaier and Koeniger (2011) also
attribute changes in the U.S. net wealth distribution across time to increases in income
risk. Considering similar savings motives in an incomplete markets life-cycle model as
in the present paper, they also abstract from the upper tail of the wealth distribution
for their analysis.
Regarding the euro area, Fessler and Schuerz (2015) provide empirical evidence
based on the HFCS for the role of welfare state policies in explaining cross-country
differences in household net wealth. Controlling for various household characteristics
and inheritance, they find in a multilevel cross-country regression that welfare state
expenditures across countries are negatively correlated with household net wealth and
hence a substitute for private wealth. Moreover, they show that the substitution ef-
fect of pension and social security expenditures with regard to private wealth holdings
is significant along the wealth distribution, but relatively lower at high wealth levels.
While the latter result empirically confirms the hypothesis that more generous public
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insurance increases wealth inequality, this present paper explicitly models various fea-
tures of the social security systems in the euro area and quantifies and decomposes their
importance for cross-country differences in wealth inequality.
The only other paper explicitly analyzing wealth inequality differences in the euro
area is empirical in nature and has stressed the importance of cross-country differences
in home ownership rates (Kaas et al., 2015) and the fact that tenants accumulate
less wealth on average than homeowners. I see my paper as complementary to their
work, as investment in housing is one way to accumulate wealth. Furthermore, given
that empirical evidence suggests a positive correlation of household income and home
ownership status and that tenants are commonly low-income households, social security
might shed light on the still puzzling question of why tenants accumulate so little wealth
compared to homeowners.
3. Redistributive Policies and Wealth Inequality in the Euro
Area
3.1 Cross-country Evidence on Wealth Inequality and the Degree of
Redistribution of Public Transfers
The newly available household data on private wealth from the Household Finance and
Consumption Survey conducted by the ECB (2013) allows a euro area wide comparison
of household wealth, given the ex ante coordination of the survey questionnaire and
methodology and its emphasis on output harmonization. As in the Survey of Consumer
Finances, oversampling procedures of wealthy households are applied in order to achieve
unbiased estimates of wealth and its distribution. The release of the first wave of the
HFCS in 2013, covering household interviews mainly conducted in the period from
2009 to 2011, allows a reasonable comparative analysis of the distribution of household
wealth across the euro area.2
First, I document along the vertical axis of Figure 3.1 that there are large cross-
country variations in household private net wealth inequality for the ten largest economies
in the euro area.3 Household net wealth is defined as the household’s total assets, i.e.
real and financial assets,4 net of its total liabilities, and excludes wealth from public
or occupational pension plans. The Gini coefficient of household private net wealth
ranges from 0.76 for Austria to 0.56 in Greece.5 The cross-country evidence on wealth
2The data for Spain in the first wave refers to the year 2008. Since the Spanish survey of household
finances (EFF) is the only survey which was conducted before the financial crisis, I use already pub-
lished data from the second wave which corresponds to the year 2011 and hence allows for a post-crisis
analysis in all countries. A comparison of the wealth Gini coefficients for the two waves in Spain
indicates an increase in wealth inequality from 0.581 to 0.608 after the bursting of the housing bubble.
3In my analysis, I focus on ten euro area countries, for which I have complete data on all parameters
of interest: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR),
Italy (IT), Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT) and Spain (ES).
4Real assets cover the household’s main residence, other real estate, vehicles, valuables, and self-
employment business wealth, while financial assets are composed of deposits, mutual funds, bonds,
publicly traded shares, voluntary pensions etc.
5Since the HFCS is a multiply imputed dataset, I take the average Gini coefficient over all five
implicates.
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inequality becomes particularly striking when it is depicted in relation to the degree of
redistribution of transfers, which generally aim at reducing income inequality. Based on
income data from the European Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC)
for 2004 to 2010, I first document that, within the euro zone, those countries with more
generous and redistributive transfers to households robustly show higher inequality in
private net wealth. The degree of redistribution of transfers is measured by the re-
duction in the Gini coefficient of after-tax earnings when augmenting it with public
transfers.6 Figure 3.1 shows that there is a negative correlation of -0.5.7
Figure 3.1: Correlation of Gini coefficients of household net wealth and percentage
change in income Gini coefficients due to transfers
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The redistributive effect of transfers in some countries is so substantial, that even
the cross-country correlation of the Gini coefficients of after tax earnings and the Gini
coefficients of net wealth switches from positive (0.12) to negative (-0.62) when adding
transfers to the income measure. So interestingly, in the euro area countries where
inequality in households’ earnings after tax and transfers is lowest and transfers reduce
the income Gini coefficient to the largest extent, private net wealth is most unequally
distributed.
Since the proposed model mechanism relates wealth inequality to public insurance
and, in particular, implies that there is a larger share of low-wealth households in more
6Public transfers are composed of unemployment benefits, old-age and survivors’ benefits, family
allowances, housing allowances, and minimum income benefits.
7In particular, this negative correlation also holds for the change in the income Gini coefficient of
only working households.
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generous welfare states, it is important to ascertain that the differences in the wealth
Gini coefficients within the euro area are not driven by differences in the share of wealth
held by the richest households. Hence, the top 5th percentile of the wealth distribution
in each country, owning on average about 50% of total wealth, is discarded. Impor-
tantly, their wealth accumulation process is unlikely to be affected by social insurance.
The results remain robust and the correlation even increases to -0.69.8 It is shown
in Appendix A that this result is also robust to other measures of wealth inequality,
such as the share of wealth held by the bottom 50%, excluding the top 5th percentile
(see Figure 3.5). Accounting for cross-country differences in household compositions
through equivalization of net wealth also preserves the result (see Figure 3.6). This
robustness of cross-country differences in wealth inequality with respect to the house-
hold structure has also been documented by Fessler et al. (2014) in a more profound
analysis.
At first, these empirical facts are surprising, as the reduction in income differences
across households through transfers would be expected to also translate into lower
wealth differences. However, this paper demonstrates, in line with the argument by
Hubbard et al. (1995), that generous public insurance crowds out private savings, es-
pecially of the poor, and thereby creates a larger of fraction of low-wealth households.
This increase in overall wealth inequality through an expansion of the left tail of the
wealth distribution in the long run outweighs the mitigating effects of lower income
differences through transfers in the short run, leading to higher wealth inequality in
more generous welfare states.
3.2 Cross-country Evidence on Wealth Inequality and the Generosity of
Public Transfers
In order to analyze differences in the generosity of various social security institutions in
the euro zone, I consider statistics on several social security payments. Plotting those
against the countries’ private net wealth Gini coefficients suggests that there might be
some systematic relationship between social security generosity and private net wealth
inequality.
Minimum Income Support Programs
Figure 3.2 shows a positive correlation of 0.81 between the Gini coefficient of private
net wealth (of the bottom 95%) and the absolute amount of minimum income benefits
of means-tested income support programs expressed as a percentage of median net la-
bor income of employed working-age households according to the EU-SILC. Since the
EuMin database on minimum income protection in Europe (Bahle and Huble, 2012)
provides the legally stipulated amounts of minimum income benefits for various house-
hold types, benefits are weighted by the household composition in the HFCS. This
positive correlation is in line with the model predictions that in countries with more
generous minimum income benefits, poor households have lower incentives to save for
8Discarding the top 10th or 20th percentile from the wealth distribution does not considerably
change the relative order and level of the Gini coefficients for private net wealth and only further
increases the negative correlation to -0.71 and -0.72, respectively.
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old-age and precautionary motives and hence wealth will be distributed more unequally.
Notably, Italy and Greece are the only two countries which do not provide universal
minimum income support to their citizens.9
Figure 3.2: Wealth inequality and minimum income benefits
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Unemployment Insurance
Furthermore, I document in Figure 3.3 a positive correlation of 0.45 between private net
wealth inequality for the bottom 95% and the average unemployment net replacement
rate over the first 60 months. Similarly to minimum income benefits, the average
unemployment benefit replacement rates are weighted by the household compositions
in the HFCS. It should be kept in mind that the average net replacement rate alone
is not indicative of which benefit system provides better insurance to households, since
9 In 1998, Italy implemented local minimum income schemes in some municipalities as an exper-
iment. However, this policy was abolished again in 2003 and replaced with an optional and poorly
subsidized policy, which enabled only some wealthier regions to implement the scheme (Casas, 2005).
Only in 2014, the Italian government decided to introduce a pilot project called "support for active
inclusion". However, so far support is linked to previous labor market participation and focuses on
families with children (Social Protection Committee, 2014). In Greece, the provision of income sup-
port is up to regional authorities and mainly targets specific groups, e.g. in old age, in mountainous
regions or poor households with children. However, as can be seen in the graph, these child benefits
are very low and amounted from 2004 until 2010 on average to 55 Euro per month. The main political
arguments in Greece against minimum income support are budgetary constraints and high regional
income diversity which hinders the government from setting one universal minimum income standard
(Casas, 2005).
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the insurance effect also depends on the duration of benefit eligibility and the expected
length of the unemployment spell.
Figure 3.3: Wealth inequality and unemployment insurance
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Public and Occupational Pension Entitlements
Figure 3.4 depicts cross-country differences in pension generosity and suggests a strong
positive relationship of 0.73 with private net wealth inequality, a finding that is in
line with the theoretical predictions of the model. The generosity of the pension
system is measured by the net pension replacement rate and defined as median net
old-age/survivors’ benefits of retired households aged 65 to 75 relative to median net
earnings of employed and unemployed households aged 50 to 60. It is calculated from
the annual waves of the EU-SILC (2004-2010). Besides public pension entitlements, it
also captures survivors’ benefits and payments by occupational pension plans.
4. Model
Following Hubbard et al. (1995), I consider a partial equilibrium life-cycle model with
incomplete markets and a small open economy.
The household sector faces idiosyncratic earnings risk, i.e. stochastic fluctuations in
gross earnings, but also an exogenous risk of becoming unemployed as in Wellschmied
(2015). Unemployment risk is explicitly modeled to analyze the role of unemployment
insurance.
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Figure 3.4: Wealth inequality and public pension wealth
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Households save for old age, and for precautionary and bequest motives. The gov-
ernment may provide public insurance to households such as asset-based means-tested
minimum income support, unemployment insurance or pension schemes. Households
pay progressive labor income taxes and make social security contributions.
4.1 Household Income
Households’ heads enter the labor market at age h1 and work for 40 years. Until
retirement at age h40, households’ gross earnings during employment are composed of
a deterministic part, µc,h, determined by age, and a stochastic component, zh, that
captures the uncertainty and persistence of earnings shocks:
ωh = µc,h + zh
The stochastic component evolves according to an AR(1) process:
zh = ρzh−1 + νh, νh ∼ N(0, σ2c )
c ∈ {AT,BE, FI, FR,DE,GR, IT,NL, PT,ES}
Employed (e) households pay progressive labor income taxes, which also include social
security contributions, and obtain net earnings:
wneth,e = (1− τ(ωh))ωh
84
where τc(ωh) is a tax rate function of gross earnings. Given that a household’s em-
ployment status and earnings determine its potential to accumulate wealth, a steeper
age-earnings profile, µc,h, higher gross earnings risk, σ2c , and unemployment risk also
translate into higher wealth inequality. However, the effect will be muted under more
progressive income taxation.
If the household becomes unemployed, the government provides unemployment in-
surance up to the retirement age of h40. In general, unemployment benefits are modeled
to replace a constant fraction of the previous period’s net earnings. To avoid an ad-
ditional state variable in the household’s problem, previous period’s net earnings are
approximated by today’s earnings, which would have realized if the household had not
become unemployed. Since the earnings process is quite persistent, last period’s net
earnings are fairly well approximated.
The country-specific initial net unemployment replacement rate rrc(ωh) is a function
of gross earnings. Households receive benefits in the first period of unemployment with
certainty and keep them in the following period with some positive probability pc. This
modeling approach is meant to capture cross-country differences in the duration of
benefit eligibility.
bh =

rrc(ωh)wneth,e , if eligible
0, if not eligible
Engen and Gruber (2001) have shown theoretically and empirically that higher unem-
ployment replacement rates decrease aggregate precautionary savings. Consequently,
in the case of redistributive unemployment schemes, i.e. households with lower gross
income have higher replacement rates, private savings of the low-income are crowded
out relatively more, thereby increasing overall wealth inequality.
However, the degree of insurance through unemployment benefits also critically de-
pends on the overall unemployment risk, i.e. the joint-job finding and job-separation
rate. Moreover, the impact of the unemployment insurance system on wealth inequal-
ity also depends on how well benefits insure households during their expected spell of
unemployment. If the expected unemployment duration is relatively long or the re-
placement rate low, households will be incentivized to increase self-insurance and hence
wealth inequality will be lower.
The household stops working at retirement age and receives public pension pay-
ments, which are a concave function fc of the household’s pre-retirement net earnings.
wrh = fc(wneth40,e), if h > 40
Consequently, the implied retirement net replacement rate declines with pre-retirement
net earnings. If the household is unemployed prior to retirement, the pension payment
replaces a fraction of the net earnings that would have realized according to the stochas-
tic process if the household had been employed in the period prior to retirement. Oth-
erwise, pension losses due to unemployment shocks would be highly overestimated, as
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pensions usually replace a fraction of life-time earnings. Since earnings are calibrated to
be quite persistent, pre-retirement earnings are used to proxy life-time earnings. There
is no explicit retirement decision.
In my framework, there are two features of the pension system affecting wealth
inequality, namely its generosity and its degree of progressivity. The more generous and
redistributive the pension entitlements, the more unequally wealth should be distributed
among households.
First, the model predicts a positive relationship between the generosity of pension
entitlements and wealth inequality. The higher expected pension payments in the fu-
ture, the less private wealth households will accumulate for old-age provision. This
displacement effect does not only matter for aggregate savings, but also for wealth
inequality, because households cannot access their public and occupational pension ac-
counts during working life. The higher the public pension entitlements, the lower the
overall stock of private net wealth that can be used for consumption smoothing in case
of negative income shocks. Households are therefore more likely to deaccumulate assets
and become borrowing-constrained in the presence of more generous pension schemes,
because they can no longer pool their precautionary and old-age savings.
Second, as with unemployment benefits, a redistributive pension scheme will par-
ticularly discourage savings of low-income households (Domeij and Klein, 2002).
More generally, household net earnings before minimum income benefits are defined
as
wneth =

ωh(1− τc(ωh)), if e and h ≤ 40
bh, if ub and h ≤ 40
ωmin, if u and h ≤ 40
wrh, if h > 40
where e stands for being employed, ub for being unemployed and eligible for unem-
ployment benefits and u for being unemployed and no longer eligible. ωmin is meant
to capture a minimum income that can be privately obtained by the household when
unemployed, e.g. through private transfers from family members outside the household.
If unemployment benefits expire or the working income is too low to cover basic
household expenses, households may become eligible for minimum income benefits, i.e.
the government guarantees a minimum consumption floor, ¯TRc. Minimum income
support programs are considered to be households’ last public safety net. In contrast
to unemployment benefits and pension payments, they are universal and hence do not
depend on past contributions, but only on the households’ current means in terms
of assets and income. Therefore, the actual transfer, TRc, made to the household
negatively depends on its choice of end-of-period wealth, kh, and its net income, wneth ,
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and is zero, if both exceed ¯TRc.
TRc(kh, wneth ) = max{0, ¯TRc − kh(1 + r)− wneth }
Asset-tested minimum income benefits were first introduced into a life-cycle model
in a seminal paper by Hubbard et al. (1995). The effect of means-tested minimum
income benefits on wealth inequality is twofold. First, minimum income support re-
duces, in particular, the downward income risk for low-income households and thereby
lowers their need to self-insure to a relatively greater extent. They show that house-
holds with high expected life-time income still maintain the usual incentives to save for
precautionary purposes, while this motive is highly distorted for the lower part of the
income distribution for whom minimum income benefits make up a larger fraction of
their life-time income, thus amplifying the wealth gap between high and low-income
households. Second, asset-based means-testing introduces an implicit tax on savings
and hence households face a trade-off between saving for precautionary motives and
dissaving to become eligible for income support.
4.2 Household Optimization Problem
Each period, the household chooses its total consumption, c, and end-of-period assets,
k, given its beginning-of-period assets, a, labor income, z, and employment status. In
particular, it forms expectations about whether it will be alive and employed in the
next period and if so, what the resulting labor market income will be. In case the
household was employed the previous period and becomes unemployed, it will always
receive unemployment benefits in the first year. The dynamic planning problem of the
household subject to the budget and non-negativity constraint will be presented for
each labor market status {e, ub, u}.
The Bellman equation of the employed household at age h is:
V (h, a, z, e) = max
c,k
{
u (c) + βE
{
(1− ιh)[(1− δc)V (h+ 1, a′, z′, e)
+ δcV (h+ 1, a′, z′, ub)] + ιhφ(a′)
}}
s.t. : c+ a
′
1 + r =a+ w
net + TRc(k, w
net)
1 + r
a′ =(1 + r)k + TRc(k, wnet) ≥ 0
where δc is the country-specific probability of job separation and E is the expectation
operator. The household dies with probability ιh at age h and with certainty at the
age of 84. For every deceased household, a new household will be born. Beginning-of-
period assets in the next period, a′, correspond to the end-of-period asset choice of the
household, the earned dividend and potential end-of-period transfers, and have to be
non-negative. The fact that low net wealth households close to the borrowing constraint
are likely to be income poor households with limited access to credit, motivates the
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assumption of zero borrowing across all countries. The utility function displays constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA) with risk aversion parameter ξ:
u(u) = 11− ξ u
1−ξ, ξ > 0,
For the bequest function, I choose the specification as in De Nardi and Yang (2015):
φ(a) = φ1
(a+ φ2)1−ξ
1− ξ , ξ > 0,
The parameter φ1 governs the desire to leave bequests, while the parameter φ2 reflects
the extent to which bequests are luxury goods. Note that households’ preferences for
leaving bequests are assumed to be equal across all countries, as the analysis of cross-
country differences in the bequest motives are beyond the scope of this paper.
The optimization problem of a currently unemployed household receiving benefits
is:
V (h, a, z, ub) = max
c,k
{
u (c) + βE
{
(1− ιh)
[
γcV (h+ 1, a′, z′, e)
+ (1− γc)[pcV (h+ 1, a′, z′, ub) + (1− pc)V (h+ 1, a′, z′, u)]
]
+ ιhφ(a′)
}}
s.t. : c+ a
′
1 + r =a+ b+
TRc(k, b)
1 + r
a′ =(1 + r)k + TRc(k, wnet) ≥ 0
The household either finds a new job with probability γc or stays in unemployment, in
which case it keeps its benefits with probability pc. This modeling approach is meant
to capture cross-country differences in the duration of benefit eligibility. I also allow for
cross-country differences in unemployment rates through country-specific parameters
for the job separation rate, δc, and job finding rate, γc, as the ultimate effect of the
unemployment insurance system on wealth inequality also depends on how well benefits
insure households during their expected period of unemployment.
The optimization problem of a currently unemployed household no longer receiving
unemployment benefits is:
V (h, a, z, u) = max
c,k
{
u (c) + βE
{
(1− ιh) [γcEV (h+ 1, a′, z′, e)
+ (1− γc)V (h+ 1, a′, z′, u)] + ιhφ(a′)
}}
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s.t. : c+ a
′
1 + r =a+ ωmin +
TRc(k, ωmin)
1 + r
a′ =(1 + r)k + TRc(k, ωmin) ≥ 0
In the present paper, I allow for a simple “warm-glow” type of bequest motive
to ensure that not all households deaccumulate their wealth during retirement. In
order to analyze the role of bequests for euro area differences in wealth inequality, and
in particular the interaction between bequests and social security provision, a more
enhanced model of bequests would be needed, where young households anticipate and
inherit only the wealth accumulated and left by their parents. In this kind of framework,
bequests generally lead to an amplification of wealth inequality in the presence of public
insurance, since social security “disinherits” the poor (Gokhale et al., 2001). However,
allowing for this type of bequest here would substantially increase the computational
burden of the model, because young households also would have to take into account
their parents’ state variables in order to form expectations about the size of their
future bequest. Therefore, the analysis of the role of bequests for cross-country wealth
inequality differences is left for future work.
5. Calibration
5.1 Household Parameters
The model’s parameters are calibrated at an annual frequency and the baseline param-
eters are reported in Table 3.1. Despite the fact that each parameter is presented to
be calibrated individually to match a specific data moment, it has to be kept in mind
that all parameters are of course calibrated jointly.
For the felicity and bequest function, I calibrate the coefficient of relative risk aver-
sion to a value of ξ = 1.5, as in a closely related paper on minimum income benefits
by Wellschmied (2015). The two parameters φ1 and φ2 governing the bequest motive
are pinned down by matching the average and median wealth of households at the end
of the life cycle relative to average and median wealth of younger households in the
euro area. φ1 determines the overall strength of the bequest motive, and is chosen to
match the average across all euro area countries’ ratios of mean wealth of households
older or equal to 84 years relative to households younger than 84 of 0.56 (see Table 3.8
Appendix C). φ2 mainly affects the distribution of wealth at older ages, as for φ2 > 0
bequests become a luxury good and only households at a certain treshold of wealth will
have the desire to leave bequests. Hence, I match in the model, as a second moment,
the average across all countries’ ratios of median wealth of households older or equal to
84 years relative to median wealth of their younger counterpart.
The annual real interest rate is set to 2.5%, which corresponds to the average across
the countries’ annual yields of 10-year national government bonds traded in the sec-
ondary market and is adjusted for inflation as measured by the annual rate of change
of the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices.10 The choice of this specific annual real
10Government bond yields and inflation rates cover the years from 1997 to 2010 and are provided
by the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse.
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interest rate is however not crucial for the model’s implied cross-country differences in
wealth inequality, as e.g. a higher real interest rate of 4% would leave the explanatory
power of the model unchanged. The model’s time preference parameter, β, is set to the
same value of 0.983 across all ten euro area countries (N=10) and chosen to equalize
the average over all countries’ Gini coefficients in the data and in the model:
λ¯ =
∑N
c=1 λc
N
=
∑N
c=1 λˆc(β,θc)
N
where λc is the Gini coefficient of private net wealth in country c according to the HFCS,
after discarding the top 5th percentile from the wealth distribution in each country.
The model’s predicted wealth Gini coefficient, λˆc(θc), for country c is a function of M
country-specific parameters, θc =
{
θ1c , ..., θ
M
c
}
, describing its labor market process and
welfare policies. In the baseline analysis, I choose to discard the top 5th percentiles
from the actual wealth distributions for the calculation of λc, as the model is, like
most incomplete markets models, incapable of matching the high wealth inequality
levels observed in the data without generating an overly large fraction of zero wealth
households.
Table 3.1: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Description Target/Source
β 0.983 Discount factor Mean over countries’ Gini coefficients of
private net wealth of 0.573 (HFCS, ∼2010)
ξ 1.5 Coefficient of RRA Wellschmied (2015)
r 2.5% Annual real interest rate Mean over countries’ real annual yields
of 10-year government bonds traded on
secondary market (ECB SDW, 1999-2010)
φ1 28 Bequest utility Avg. euro area ratio of median/mean
φ2 8.8 Bequest utility shifter wealth of heads aged ≥ 84 relative median/
mean wealth of heads aged < 84: 0.3167/0.5559
ah1 e5813 Initial asset level Mean over countries’ median asset holdings
at age 22 of households with heads aged 20-25
ωmin 0 Private transfers Median net private transfers received by
to unemployed household unemployed households (EU-SILC, 2004-2010)
ιh Probability of dying Life tables for euro area countries,
Eurostat (1995-2010)
h1 22 Age of labor market entry 40 years of working life
h40 62 Age of retirement Avg. pensionable age in (OECD, 1999-2010)
h62 84 Age of decease Oldest age in life table
All countries are assumed to have the same annual survival probabilities for house-
holds’ heads at a given age. They are set to the average across all country-specific
survival probability rates. This data is provided by the Eurostat life tables for the time
span from 1995 to 2010. The survival probability of households at age 84 is set to zero.
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To account for the current age structure of the population in euro area, I average across
the countries’ age distributions in the HFCS, approximate the resulting euro area age
distribution with a polynomial function of order five and apply the obtained age weights
to the model before computing the Gini coefficients.
Households at the age of 22 start with an initial asset level of ah1 = e5813, which
corresponds to the mean over countries’ median asset holdings of households with heads
aged between 20 and 25.11 The median unemployed household in the EU-SILC received
zero net private transfers from 2004 to 2010. To test for robustness, I will also allow
for positive private transfers in section 6.
I then assume that all countries share the same baseline parameters shown in Table
3.1 and I allow them to differ only in the parameters describing the unemployment and
net earnings process, as well as the social security system. This way, I can examine
the variation in cross-country wealth inequalities that are generated by the countries’
specificities of their social security institutions and labor markets.
5.2 Labor Market Process Before Retirement
Earnings and unemployment dynamics are assumed to be purely exogenous. The job
separation and finding rates are chosen to match the average unemployment rate and
percentage share of long-term unemployed in each country. The household unemploy-
ment rates for the time span 2004 to 2010 in the ten euro area countries are calculated
from the EU-SILC dataset using weights and are displayed in Table 3.2. They are
derived from the employment status of the household’s head who is identified as the
household member with the highest personal income, in terms of gross earnings and
public individual transfers such as e.g. unemployment benefits. The percentage of long-
term unemployed households, i.e. households with heads being unemployed for more
than a year, cannot be determined from the EU-SILC directly and is hence approxi-
mated with the average percentage share of long-term unemployed individuals reported
by Eurostat from 2004 to 2010.
The earnings risk is estimated for each country from EU-SILC gross earnings data of
employed households’ heads between 25 and 60 years. I assume that the observed log-
income of a household, yi,h,t is composed of a deterministic part, f(oi,h,t), determined
by observable household characteristics of the household head, oi,h,t, and a stochastic
component, y∗i,h,t, which follows an AR(1) process with persistence ρ:
yi,h,t = f(oi,h,t) + y∗i,h,t, (3.1)
y∗i,h,t = ρy∗i,h−1,t−1 + νi,h,t, (3.2)
νi,h,t ∼ N(0, σˆ2c ) (3.3)
where t is the year and h is the age of household i. Earnings shocks, νi,h,t, are assumed
to be drawn from a log-normal distribution. This log-normality assumption, although
it usually does not hold perfectly, allows me to approximate the earnings process using
a Markov chain with seven income states.
11Note that households’ initial wealth does not necessarily coincide with the amount of bequests left
by deceased households.
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I estimate the deterministic component, f(oi,h,t) by regressing log-earnings on an age
polynomial of order 4, education and gender dummies, and the household composition.
In order to control for variations in household size and composition over the life cycle,
I include the number of heads (single or couple), the number of children younger than
18 and the number of other dependent adults in each household. I eliminate any
observation where the residual of this regression, y∗i,h,t, belongs to the bottom or top
0.5 % of all residuals.
Following Hintermaier and Koeniger (2016), the sample variance of the residuals,
y∗i,h,t, from this regression is used to derive the country-specific short-run variance of
gross earnings shocks, σˆ2c , assuming the same persistence of ρ = 0.95 of earnings shocks
across all countries, a common estimate in the empirical literature. This parameter
is calibrated rather than estimated, such that the cross-country differences predicted
by the model do not depend on imprecise estimates of this parameter, given the short
time horizon of only 3 years available for estimation in some countries.12 While con-
trolling for household characteristics leads to an underestimation of overall earnings
heterogeneity in the model, it allows me to obtain a better proxy for pure earnings risk.
This is important because the degree of earnings risk matters for the accumulation of
precautionary savings and its distribution, which aside from savings for old age is of
main interest in this paper.
Since the EU-SILC panel only follows a household for three consecutive years, it
is not possible to observe the full life-cycle earnings of a cohort. However, I make
use of the cross-sectional age-earnings patterns to approximate deterministic life-cycle
profiles, µc,h, in the respective countries. Therefore, I determine median gross earnings
at each age and smooth the profile using a forth order polynomial. Since, due to
positive real earnings growth e.g. cohorts at the age of 30 have on average a higher
nominal median earnings level than cohorts of currently 50-years did have 20 years ago,
this cross-sectional age-earnings profile underestimates earnings growth over the life
cycle. Hence, in order to make average earnings comparable across cohorts, I need to
transform median earnings at a given age relative to the base age of 50 by multiplying
it with the real wage growth factor (1 + g)age−50. I adjust all earnings profiles with the
euro area average real growth rate of 1% calculated from average real wages from 1990
until 2010 provided by the OECD Database.13 Figure 3.7 shows the countries’ cross-
sectional age-earnings profiles, adjusted for real euro area wage growth. Furthermore,
they are divided by the average Purchasing Power Parity index from 2004 to 2010 of
the respective country to ensure comparability across the euro area. Note that the
results are also robust to using average gross earnings instead of median earnings for
the calibration of the age-earnings profile.
As the EU-SILC is a survey specifically designed to measure household income, gross
earnings data from the EU-SILC is preferred over data from the HFCS. While house-
12The EU-SILC Survey was implemented in 2004 in Austria, Belgium, Finland and France, in 2005
in Germany and the Netherlands, in 2006 in Spain, and in 2007 in Greece, Italy and Portugal.
13Average real wages are obtained by dividing the national-accounts-based total wage bill by the
average number of employees in the total economy, which is then multiplied by the ratio of the average
usual weekly hours per full-time employee to the average usual weekly hours for all employees. They
are measured in USD constant prices using 2012 as a base year and Purchasing Power Parities for
private consumption in the same year.
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holds interviewed in the EU-SILC are explicitly asked for all potential income sources,
earnings questions in the HFCS are more broadly categorized, thereby increasing the
risk of imprecise measurement.
Table 3.2: Parameters of labor market risk
Country Std. of earnings Job sep. Job find. Unempl. Fract. of long-term
shocks σ rate δ rate γ rate unemployed (>1 y)
AT 0.1809 0.0351 0.7450 6.4% 53%
BE 0.1501 0.0405 0.4590 9.8% 23%
FI 0.1539 0.0840 0.7560 8.3% 30%
FR 0.1599 0.0611 0.6100 7.8% 23%
DE 0.1802 0.0447 0.4810 10.5% 40%
GR 0.1885 0.0578 0.5090 5.6% 48%
IT 0.1723 0.0417 0.4220 6.7% 49%
NL 0.1533 0.0370 0.6610 2.9% 48%
PT 0.1758 0.0437 0.5550 7.6% 49%
ES 0.1750 0.1021 0.5880 9.9% 27%
5.3 Policy Parameters
Minimum Income Support
Information on the absolute amount of minimum income benefits is taken from a com-
parative database on minimum income protection in Europe, which provides annual
data from 2004 until 2008. The data is based on the OECD tax and benefit model
which simulates minimum income benefits for various household types (single person
or married couple, without children or with 2 children). However, the corresponding
OECD “Benefits and Wages” database only provides information for the years 2005,
2007 and 2010. Therefore, I make use of the data provided by the EuMin database
until 2008 and complement it with OECD data for 2010 and interpolate in-between for
2009. Minimum income benefits cover cash benefits, including housing benefits as well
as child benefits. Since e.g. married couples with children are entitled to more generous
social assistance, I take the different household compositions in the euro area countries
into account when computing the average expected entitlements by weighting with the
corresponding percentage of households of each type in the sample.14 Figure 3.2 shows
the weighted absolute amount of minimum income benefits expressed as a percentage
14Using information on the relationship and age of household members in the HFCS, I assign all
households in each country to 4 different types which are meant to approximate the aforementioned
types stipulated in the OECD benefit model: Single head or head in partnership/marriage, without
children or with at least one child.
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of median net earnings of employed households aged 25 to 60 in the EU-SILC sample.15
Unemployment Insurance
The OECD database “Benefits and Wages” reports the initial unemployment net re-
placement rates for multiples of average worker (AW) gross earnings and 6 different
household types (single person, one-earner married couple or two-earner married cou-
ple, without children or with two children). Since unemployment net replacement rates
differ for distinct household types due to e.g. potential family, childcare or lone-parent
benefits, the average net replacement rate used for the calibration of the model is ob-
tained by weighting with the corresponding fraction of households of each approximate
type in the sample. Similarly to the weighting of minimum income benefits, I use infor-
mation from the HFCS on age, and employment status and relationships of household
members, to assign households to 6 categories. Since unemployment benefits depend
on an additional characteristic of the household, namely whether the household is a
one-earner or two-earner married couple, I also use information on the employment
status to classify households.
Figure 3.8 in Appendix C depicts the initial net replacement rate, averaged over the
years 2004 and 2010, as a function of multiples of average gross earnings and reveals
that unemployment benefits replace a larger fraction of previous earnings for low-income
households.16 The country-specific probability, pc, of keeping benefits from the second
year on is chosen to match the average net replacement rates over the first 5 years of
unemployment, a statistic also provided by the OECD database.
Public and Occupational Pension Scheme
The net pension replacement rate as shown in Figure 3.4 is defined as the median net
old-age and survivors’ benefits of retired households aged 65 to 75 relative to median
net earnings of employed and unemployed households aged 50 to 60 in the EU-SILC.
Since most occupational pension plans held by households are still of type defined
benefit and future payments are therefore dependent on unknown future conditions, the
HFCS measures households’ entitlements to their occupational pension plans relatively
15Spain constitutes a special case, as it is the only country where minimum income provision is a
regional competence and conditions of payment can hence vary across regions. Therefore, the minimum
income support for Spain reported in the EuMin database only refers to the amount of minimum income
benefits available to households resident in the community of Madrid. Moreover, minimum income
benefits are only of unlimited duration in the six autonomous communities of Asturias, Castilla y Leon,
Madrid, Cataluna, Extremadura and Valencia (length of 3 years), which were inhabited by 50.7% of
Spain’s total population in 2011. The calibration strategy for Spain is to solve the model twice, first
for regions for which the model assumes no minimum income scheme for simplicity, and second, for
the remaining regions under the assumption that these provide unlimited minimum income benefits of
an amount equal to that of Madrid. The overall implied Gini coefficient of private net wealth in Spain
is computed from the weighted average of the two resulting wealth distributions.
16For the model’s calibration, I assume that households with previous gross earnings levels smaller
than 67% of average gross earnings have the same net replacement rate as households with previous
earnings equal to 67% of average gross earnings. The net replacement rates of households with previous
gross earnings larger than 1.5 times of average gross earnings are extrapolated and stay constant.
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Table 3.3: Policy Parameters
Parameter Target Data Source
Minimum income benefits
¯TRc Income floor (weighted EuMin database (2004-2008),
by household composition) OECD “Benefits and Wages” database (2010)
Unemployment insurance
rrc(ωh) Initial net replacement rate (weighted) OECD “Benefits and Wages”
pc Avg. net replacement rate over database (2004/2010)
first 5 years of unemployment
Pensions
fc(x) = acx
1
bc Median net pension replacement rate EU-SILC (2004-2010), adjusted for
Pension progressivity index 1− gini(wr41)
gini(wnet40 )
real wage growth
Earnings tax
τc(ωh) Avg. tax rate schedule defined OECD tax database (2010)
on multiples of average earnings
poorly. Therefore, I follow the Household Finance and Consumption Network and only
include private pension wealth in the calculation of total private net wealth. Instead,
the net pension replacement rate includes income from both public and occupational
pension plans, but excludes pension income from individual private plans. In order to
allow for comparability of incomes of different cohorts, I adjust earnings and pensions
for the average euro area real wage growth of 1%, as described in Section 5.2. In
order to capture the extent to which the public and occupational pension systems
are redistributive, the pension progressivity index is calculated. In the model, the
index is defined as 1 minus the ratio of the Gini coefficient of net pension income wr41
relative to the Gini coefficient of pre-retirement net income of employed and unemployed
households wnet40 (see formula in Table 3.3). For this measure, I again refer to the
two age groups used for the calculation of the net replacement rate. If pensions are
perfectly proportional to pre-retirement income and hence not redistributive, the Gini
coefficient of pensions is equal to the Gini coefficient of pre-retirement earnings and the
progressivity index corresponds to 0. If there were a flat-rate pension scheme instead,
the Gini coefficient of pensions is zero and the index would take a value of 1. I assume
that pension payments are a concave function of the household’s pre-retirement net
earnings: fc(x) = acx
1
bc . I choose the constant ac and bc in order to match the pension
progressivity index and median net replacement rate in the EU-SILC. The resulting net
replacement rates are declining convex functions of pre-retirement net earnings and are
shown in Figure 3.9 of Appendix C. For the calibration, I choose an empirical estimate
over the theoretical net replacement rates provided by the OECD, because the latter
neglect public pensions paid to state employees, which are quite generous in Germany
and France.17
17The OECD replacement rates measure the theoretical net pension replacement rate of a represen-
tative worker who works a full career and enters the labor market today taking into account all to
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Labor Income Taxes and Social Security Contributions
The OECD income tax database provides the average labor income tax rates for various
levels of gross earnings. It includes central and sub-central government income taxes
as well as employee social security contributions. The tax schedule which is defined
over multiples of average earnings is directly applied in the model and interpolated
in-between. Negative average tax rates are ruled out. Since the OECD tax database
only provides the average tax rates for up to twice the average earnings, top marginal
tax rates are used to infer the average tax rate for higher earnings (see Guvenen et al.
(2014) for the applied method).
6. Results
This section presents the main results. In the following, I seek to answer which fraction
of euro area variation in wealth inequality can be attributed to differences in labor
market dynamics and the various features of the social security system. Furthermore,
I will identify how much each factor contributes individually to this fraction.
6.1 Quantitative Importance of Labor Income Dynamics and Welfare
Policies
First, I will determine which fraction of euro area variation in wealth inequality can be
explained by all factors of interest. In order to determine the predictive power of the
model for cross-country differences in wealth inequality, I make use of the coefficient of
determination. It is a common measure to determine the goodness of fit of forecasting
models. The model’s predicted wealth Gini coefficient, λˆc(θc), for country c is based
on a parameter vector of all the country-specific parameters, θc, describing its welfare
policies and labor market process, and can be interpreted as a forecast of the actual
wealth Gini coefficient, λc. Let ˆc denote the forecast error of the model when predicting
the wealth Gini coefficient of country c:
ˆc = λc − λˆc(θc)
The model’s time preference parameter, β, is set equally across all ten countries (N=10)
and calibrated to equalize the average across all country’s Gini coefficients in the data
and in the model, given the country-specific parameterization. This implies an average
model prediction error, ¯ˆ, of zero and hence no systematic over- or underestimation of
wealth inequality levels for the euro area countries considered. Assuming that all the
countries share the same baseline parameter values shown in Table 3.1, I allow them to
differ only in the parameters describing the unemployment and net earnings process, as
well as the social security system. The coefficient of determination is used to quantify
the predictive power of the model for cross-country variations in wealth inequality.
date enacted pensions reforms. So while the OECD net replacement rates refers to individuals, the
EU-SILC median net replacement rate refers to a household unit. Furthermore, the OECD theoretical
replacement rate might overestimate pension entitlements in countries with higher unemployment rates
or lower labor market participation rates.
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The coefficient of determination, R2, relates the total sum of squared forecast errors
generated by the calibrated model to the total sum of squared forecast errors implied
by a benchmark model predicting the same Gini coefficient, namely the mean, for each
country. However, squaring forecast errors leads to an unequal weighting of small and
large forecast errors. Therefore, in order to equally weight each country’s forecast
for the overall assessment of the model, a modified coefficient of determination, R, is
introduced which expresses forecast errors in absolute instead of squared terms. It is
defined as:
R = 1−
∑N
c=1 |ˆc|∑N
c=1 |λc − λ¯|
Relative to other constants, the mean is the most suitable benchmark forecast to evalu-
ate the model’s predictive power due to its property of minimizing the sum of absolute
forecast errors:
λ¯ ∈ argmin
{
ΣNc=1|λc − x|
}
Table 3.4 quantifies the overall importance of welfare policies and labor income dy-
namics for cross-country variations in wealth inequality using R. Overall, the model
results suggest that those factors can explain 70.1% of the differences in wealth in-
equality across the euro area for the bottom 95% in each country’s wealth distribution.
Importantly, note that the parameter vector is not chosen to maximize this statistic, but
is calibrated to the observed differences in welfare policies and labor market dynamics
across countries. As it turns out, the modified measure, R, is more conservative com-
pared to R2, which implies for the same predictions an explanatory power of 89.2%.
The higher R2 originates from the fact that the model performs particularly well in
forecasting the large differences in wealth Gini coefficients across countries.
The first two columns of Table 3.4 report the 95%-wealth Gini coefficient for all
countries according to the HFCS, first in levels, in column (a), and then in column (b)
and (c) expressed as a deviation and squared deviation from the mean across all euro
area Gini coefficients. Column (d) and (e) depict the same statistics as column (a)
and (b) for the model predictions, λˆc(β,θc). Negative deviations imply that the wealth
Gini coefficient in the respective country is below average, while positive deviations
indicate countries in the euro area with above-average wealth inequality. Comparing
the signs of the deviations in column (b) and (e) reveals that for every country the
model correctly predicts the relative ranking of wealth inequality with respect to the
mean. Furthermore, the table shows in column (f) the prediction errors of the model’s
forecasts, as well as absolute errors in column (g). The row labeled “Mean” in Table
3.4 demonstrates in column (a) and (d) that the average of Gini coefficients λc in the
data of 0.573 equals, through the calibration of β, the mean of the model’s implied Gini
coefficients. For the same reason, the average forecast error of the model in column (f)
is zero.
In the last row of the table, labeled R, the modified coefficient of determination
is reported. It indicates that the model can explain 70.1%(= 1 − 0.01720.0575) of the cross-
country differences in wealth inequality for the bottom 95% of the private net wealth
distributions in 2010. Column (h) reports how well the model performs for the respective
countries and the explanatory power of the model ranges from 37.4% for France to 97.5%
for Italy. When including the richest 5% in the calculation of the Gini coefficients,
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the explanatory power of the model drops to 27.8% after recalibrating the preference
parameter to β = 0.961 in order to match the average across all country’s wealth Gini
coefficients of 0.654 in the data. This finding is consistent with the notion that the
wealth accumulation process of the wealthiest 5% is unlikely to be driven by one of the
savings motives considered in this model.
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Table 3.4: Gini coefficients of private net wealth in the data and model
bottom 95% all
Data Model Forecast Error Goodness of fit
λc λc − λ¯ |λc − λ¯| λˆc(β,θc) λˆc(β,θc)− λ¯ ˆc |ˆc| 1− (g)(c)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i)
Austria 0.656 -0.083 0.0833 0.634 -0.061 -0.022 0.0219 73.8%
Belgium 0.522 0.051 0.0508 0.535 0.037 0.013 0.0135 73.5%
Finland 0.612 -0.040 0.0399 0.608 -0.035 -0.005 0.0048 88.1%
France 0.591 -0.019 0.0190 0.603 -0.031 0.012 0.0119 37.4%
Germany 0.661 -0.088 0.0884 0.624 -0.052 -0.037 0.0366 58.6%
Greece 0.499 0.074 0.0738 0.525 0.048 0.026 0.0262 64.5%
Italy 0.516 0.056 0.0561 0.518 0.055 0.001 0.0014 97.5%
Netherlands 0.629 -0.057 0.0569 0.607 -0.034 -0.023 0.0227 60.2%
Portugal 0.540 0.033 0.0326 0.547 0.025 0.007 0.0073 77.5%
Spain 0.498 0.074 0.0741 0.524 0.048 0.026 0.0256 65.4%
Mean 0.573 0.000 0.0575 0.573 0.000 0.000 0.0172
R 70.1% 27.8%
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6.2 Decomposition
This section introduces a decomposition method which quantifies the separate effects
of labor market dynamics, the pension system, unemployment insurance and minimum
income benefits for the fraction explained by the model of 70.1%, as reported in Table
3.4. The decomposition method presented here is most closely related to one adopted in
a paper by Guvenen et al. (2014) in which they analyze the extent to which differences
in wage inequality between the US, their chosen reference country, and six other central
European countries can be attributed to differences in labor income tax progressivity
and also provide a decomposition.
For the decomposition exercise, I construct a fictive euro area country (EA) that
serves as a benchmark country. Its policy parameters are defined as the average across
all country-specific individual parameters, θic:
θiEA =
ΣNc=1θic
N
, i = 1, ..M
By sequentially setting the country-specific parameters to those of the reference country
and recalibrating the discount factor, β, to match the mean wealth Gini coefficient λ¯
in the data, the contribution of the income process and each policy to the euro area
variation in wealth inequality can be determined. Finally, when setting all parameters
to those of the fictive euro area benchmark country, all countries will exhibit the same
mean Gini coefficient, λEA(θEA) = λ¯, as no differences remain.
Table 3.5 demonstrates the decomposition method which disentangles the contri-
bution of each factor to the explanatory power of the model for cross-country wealth
inequality differences. First, in column (1), I set the income process and all welfare
policies to the country-specific parameters and obtain R as reported in Table 3.4.
In the next column (2), I then assume that all countries have the same labor income
and unemployment dynamics as in the EA reference country, but still differ in the social
security dimensions considered. At this stage the discount factor, β, is recalibrated in
order to equalize the average of actual and predicted wealth Gini coefficients across
the euro area and R is again determined. This step allows me to separate the role
of those three policies from that of the labor market dynamics. The difference of the
coefficient of determination, R, in columns (1) and (2) in the last row provides a useful
measure of the role of the income process, which accounts for 12.2% (= 70.1%−57.9%)
of euro area differences in wealth inequality. Note that the share contributed by the
income process is conditional on the order in which the country-specific parameters are
set to those of the EA benchmark country. This is due to an interdependence of all
policies with each other and with labor market dynamics. To exemplify the interaction
of labor market dynamics with the unemployment insurance or public pension scheme,
one can consider two countries with different degrees of net earnings risk. The same
net unemployment or pension replacement rate would lead to a larger crowding-out of
savings in the country with low income risk, because future benefits are less uncertain.
Next in column (3), I also set the unemployment insurance system of each country equal
to the one in the fictive EA reference country, but each country retains its own public
and occupational pension scheme and minimum income support program. Taking the
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Table 3.5: Conditional decomposition of cross-country differences in wealth inequality
(1) (2) (3) (4) Fraction
explained
MI* - - - - 42.6%
Pensions - - - set to EA 10.6%
UI* - - set to EA set to EA 4.7%
Income - set to EA set to EA set to EA 12.2%
Austria 0.634 0.600 0.601 0.586
Belgium 0.535 0.566 0.568 0.574
Finland 0.608 0.605 0.601 0.601
France 0.603 0.596 0.594 0.581
Germany 0.624 0.603 0.602 0.598
Greece 0.525 0.507 0.519 0.528
Italy 0.518 0.521 0.530 0.525
Netherlands 0.607 0.629 0.620 0.619
Portugal 0.547 0.563 0.559 0.570
Spain 0.524 0.534 0.531 0.543
R 70.1% 57.9% 53.1% 42.6%
β 97.3 97.5 97.6 97.6
Notes: UI*= Unemployment insurance, MI*=Minimum-income support.
difference between columns (2) and (3) reveals that the unemployment insurance system
contributes 4.7%, conditional on the income process being equal across all countries.
Continuing in this manner, I am ultimately able to separate the conditional role of each
institution for euro area wealth inequality differences. Finally, setting all the parameters
to the one of the euro area reference country will lead to an R of zero. This is because
R assesses the model’s forecasts, λˆc(θc), against a simple benchmark model predicting
the mean, λ¯, for each country and hence zero variation in cross-country differences in
wealth inequality, a prediction that my model exactly makes if there are no euro area
differences in country-specific parameters, θc.
To get an estimate of the effects of income risk and the welfare policies that is
not dependent on the specific ordering, I will determine the contribution to the overall
fraction explained by each factor for every possible ordering and take the average. In
total, there are four different factors considered in the decomposition, which leads to
16 possible orders, each providing an estimate for the contribution of one determinant.
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Table 3.6: Unconditional decomposition of cross-country differences in wealth inequality
Fraction
explained
MI* 44.8%
Pensions 10.7%
UI* 2.0%
Income 12.6%
Notes: UI*= Unemployment insurance, MI*=Minimum-income support.
Table 3.6 provides the results of this final unconditional decomposition method.
The decomposition results indeed change slightly compared to Table 3.5 and suggest
that welfare policies contribute 57.5% to the euro area differences in the net wealth
Gini coefficients for the bottom 95% of the wealth distribution. It turns out that the
most important drivers of the social security system for determining wealth inequality
differences across the euro area are means-tested minimum income support programs
and pension schemes. While the pension system can rationalize 10.7%, minimum income
support programs stand out by far, accounting for 44.8% of the differences. Institutional
differences in unemployment insurance systems across the euro area, by contrast, play
with 2% only a minor role. Furthermore, 12.6% of the cross-country differences in
wealth inequality can be attributed to the net earnings process and unemployment
dynamics.
The strong effect of minimum income support programs on the wealth distribu-
tion relative to other policies is due to several distinct features. First, means-tested
minimum income benefits do not depend on any past contributions, but only on the
households’ current means. Hence, they are much more redistributive across individu-
als compared to unemployment benefits or pensions, which are in the euro area rather
redistributive over the life cycle. Hubbard et al. (1995) have shown that the lower
bound on consumption leaves the precautionary savings decision of households with
high expected life-time income relatively unaffected, while the need for self-insurance
for households in the lower part of the income distribution strongly reduces, thereby
increasing wealth inequality. Second, minimum income assistance guarantees a certain
lump sum transfer, while future potential unemployment benefits replace a constant
fraction of previous net income and are hence still dependent on uncertain net income.
While the receipt of pension payments during retirement is certain, also some uncer-
tainty about the exact pension level during retirement remains, as pensions will depend
on the household’s pre-retirement labor market performance. Since households are risk
averse, this uncertainty characteristic of unemployment and pension benefits leads to
weaker effects on wealth inequality despite sizeable aggregate effects on wealth. Third,
the asset-test of minimum income support introduces an implicit tax on savings, such
that low-wealth households face a trade-off between saving for bad income states and
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Table 3.7: Robustness
Specification R
1) No asset test 70.8%
2) Private transfers 68.2%
3) Share held by 69.7%
bottom 50%
dissaving to become eligible for income support. And last, minimum income benefits
are of unlimited duration, while unemployment benefits mitigate earnings losses only
temporarily.
It is shown in Table 3.7 that the importance of minimum income support programs
for determining wealth inequality differences does not crucially depend on the trans-
fers’ characteristic of being asset-tested. It can be shown that the explanatory power
of the model remains high at 70.8% when assuming the extreme case of 100% asset
exemption levels for all euro area countries. While e.g. the predicted wealth inequality
for Germany slightly worsens after abolishing the asset-test and recalibrating the time
preference parameter, the model prediction of the Gini wealth coefficient for Greece
moves under this assumption closer to the actual value. Next, I also relax the assump-
tion of zero income during unemployment and allow for positive private transfers of
10% of the country’s median net earnings to unemployed households. Relative to the
baseline results, the explanatory power of the model only slightly decreases by 2%.
As a further robustness test, the share of total net wealth held by the bottom 50% of
the population is considered as an alternative measure for wealth inequality in Table
3.7, again excluding the top 5th percentile of the wealth distribution in the data. The
results are also robust to this measure. On average, policies and income processes can
also account for 69.7% of the cross-country variation in the net wealth share held by
the poorest 50%.18
These results also shed light on the documented empirical puzzle that countries with
a larger reduction in the income Gini coefficient through transfers, show higher wealth
inequality. Since higher after-tax earnings inequality and unemployment rates lead to
higher wealth inequality, one would expect that transfers by reducing income differences,
lower wealth inequality in turn. In fact, the opposite is true. While transfers temporarily
mitigate income differences across households, their general availability leads to a more
unequal wealth distribution in the long run. Furthermore, the analysis also questions
a common practice in the incomplete markets literature of estimating the standard
deviation of household income shocks directly from after-tax and transfers income data
18While the 90/10 and the 50/10 percentile ratios are suitable and commonly used to analyze in-
equality of income distributions, they are less suited when working with wealth distributions, because
the 10th percentile can be negative or close to zero and hence the ratio can be negative or infinite.
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for the model’s calibration, as this leads to an overly low implied wealth inequality. It
is therefore important to model both the earnings process and transfers explicitly if the
wealth distribution is essential for the question at hand.
7. Conclusion
Consistent with the theory of Hubbard et al. (1995) that public insurance distorts
private savings decisions especially of low-income and low-wealth households, I empir-
ically document that countries with more generous and redistributive welfare policies
have considerably higher wealth inequality. Using a structural life-cycle model featuring
labor market risk, bequests, and various institutions of the social security system, it is
shown that labor market dynamics and redistributive policies can account for 70.1% of
the euro area variation in wealth inequality for the bottom 95% of the wealth distri-
bution. Furthermore, I provide a decomposition of the individual roles of the factors
considered. It is shown that welfare policies can account for 57.5% of the euro area
differences in wealth inequality and that the most important institution of the social
security system driving these results is means-tested minimum income support provided
by the government. Since minimum income support benefits are highly redistributive
across individuals, certain, asset-tested and of unlimited duration, they strongly affect
wealth inequality, and euro area differences in this institution can account for 44.8%
of the differences in the net wealth Gini coefficients. Public and occupational pension
entitlements and labor market dynamics can rationalize 10.7% and 12.6%, respectively.
In contrast, cross-country differences in unemployment insurance systems have with 2%
only little explanatory power. I also demonstrate that the asset-based means-testing of
minimum income provision is not central to the overall explanatory power of minimum
income benefits, as the model’s explanatory power remains unchanged when minimum
income benefits are assumed to be 100% exempt from the asset-test.
While many studies on wealth inequality focus on determinants which influence the
upper tail of the wealth distribution, this analysis sheds light on the remaining part,
and in particular, the role of public insurance. When considering the bottom 95% of the
wealth distribution, there are still large cross-country differences in wealth inequality to
be understood and this analysis reveals that redistributive welfare policies are indeed
central in determining wealth inequality patterns across the euro area.
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Appendices
A. Robustness of Empirical Facts
Figure 3.5: Share of wealth held by 50th percentile (bottom 95%)
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Figure 3.6: Gini coefficient of equivalized household net wealth (bottom 95%)
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B. Numerical Methods
The household problem is solved backwards by starting in the last period of life, h62.
Optimal consumption and savings choices in previous periods are then derived, given
subsequent optimal consumption choices and corresponding value functions. I solve
for the optimal policies of households whose income is sufficiently low to be eligible
for minimum income support, but whose current wealth is such that they never want
to take up this support and hence choose end of period wealth holdings kh > ¯TRc −
wneth , by applying the endogenous gridpoint method as originally developed in Carroll
(2006). For lower current wealth holdings, multiple local maxima can emerge and
hence, following Wellschmied (2015), I solve for the global maximum via value function
iteration and allow for at least 2000 asset choices with a very fine asset grid at the
low end of the asset distribution. Increasing the number of gridpoints did not have a
noticeable effect on the model-implied Gini coefficients of private net wealth. Also if
households are not currently eligible for minimum income support since wneth ≥ ¯TRc,
multiple maxima and distortions can arise for households with sufficiently low current
wealth levels and hence optimal policies are in this region determined by value function
iteration. These distortions arise due to the life-cycle dimension and stochastic nature of
earnings. Households place a positive probability on entering a low income state that
could potentially make them eligible for means-tested income support in the future.
Therefore, today’s value function inherits the kinks in the expected value functions of
states when households are eligible for minimum income benefits.
I approximate the idiosyncratic gross earnings process using a discrete Markov chain
with 7 states, using the method proposed by Tauchen (1986).
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C. Calibration
Table 3.8: Aggregate wealth and its distribution at the end of the life cycle
Country Amean,h≥84
Amean,h<84
Amedian,h≥84
Amedian,h<84
AT 0.54 0.43
BE 0.33 0.14
FI 0.66 0.37
FR 0.50 0.27
DE 0.71 0.64
GR 0.67 0.29
IT 0.39 0.17
NL 0.59 0.36
PT 0.81 0.39
ES 0.37 0.16
EA Avg. 0.56 0.32
Sources: Own calculations, HFCS (∼2010, excl. top 5th percentile)
Notes: Amean,h≥84Amean,h<84=ratio of mean wealth of households older or equal to 84 years relative to
mean wealth of households younger than 84; Amedian,h≥84Amedian,h<84=ratio of mean wealth of households
older or equal to 84 years relative to mean wealth of households younger than 84. The
average values for the euro area shown in the last row are used for the calibration of the
bequest function.
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Figure 3.7: Cross-sectional age-earnings profile, adjusted for euro area real wage growth
and PPP
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Figure 3.8: Unemployment net replacement rate
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Figure 3.9: Public and occupational pension replacement rate
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